Tactics, NAVAL, may be defined as the art of manœuvring ships and fleets for the purposes of battle. Naval strategy, on the other hand, is the science of combining and employing fleets or single ships in order to carry out defined operations at sea or against an enemy's coast, for obtaining command of the sea or certain portions of it. Although fleets had existed and battles at sea been fought from the earliest periods, it was not until towards the close of the 16th century, in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, that naval war began to assume definite form. The discovery of the New World and the occupation of its richest territories by Spain, the opening up of the route to the East Indies by the Cape of Good Hope, and the efforts which English merchants began to make at this time to push their own trade gave a marvellous impetus to the sea-borne commerce of the world, which carried with it as a necessary consequence the building of larger and more seaworthy ships than had previously existed. War at sea at this time does not appear to have been carried on on any definite plan, and consisted principally, if we except the attempt of the Great Armada, of raids on the enemy's commerce and coast-towns. According to Admiral Colomb, in his excellent work on Naval Warfare, the first organised attempts to obtain command of the sea as a distinct aim of the operations carried on are to be found in the three wars between the Dutch and English of 1652, 1665, and 1672. Both parties made desperate attempts to destroy the trade of the other, but in the second war Holland, considering the command of the sea the more important object, temporarily gave up her commerce, Dutch merchant-ships being forbidden to put to sea. The net result of the three wars was to leave the honours pretty evenly divided between the two combatants. Several efforts were made by the French, between 1690 and their crushing defeat at Trafalgar, to obtain the command of the sea in order to effect the invasion of England. The first of these attempts, affording one of the best examples of the value of a thorough grasp of strategical principles, was foiled by the Earl of Torrington. An experienced seaman and profound strategist, the earl was forced against his better judgment, by direct orders from the queen and council, to attack the vastly superior forces under Tourville, and accordingly he gave battle (30th June 1690) off Beachy Head. He was defeated, but skilfully drew off and fell back under shelter of the Gunfleet Shoals at the mouth of the Thames. Here, although 'beaten, inferior, and shut up behind sandbanks,' yet from the strategic position it now held this fleet still remained such a 'power in observation' as to paralyse the action of the victorious and superior force; and the French admiral, after some ineffective attempts at landing, returned to Brest. During the Napoleonic wars, the English fleets having more or less complete command of the sea, the strategy of the commanders seems to have resolved itself into blockade of the enemy where possible, or a close observation of his movements with a view to prevent any junction of his scattered forces; and if he ventured to put to sea, into efforts to bring him to action as soon as possible. Steam may be said to have revolutionised naval strategy and tactics; whereas the best-laid schemes were often frustrated by foul winds and gales, now the great steam-power of battle-ships and cruisers renders them independent of wind and to a great extent of bad weather. As a set-off, however, to this, the coal endurance of ships and the replenishing of their supplies of fuel become important factors in deciding upon their movements. The two principal objects of Great Britain's naval strategy must be the command of the Channel with the seas round her coasts, and the protection of the great trade routes. For this purpose a fleet of battle-ships strong enough to meet any hostile combination, supplemented by a proportionate number of fast cruisers, is indispensable. Neglect to provide an adequate number of both classes of ships would almost certainly land the country in disaster; a deficiency in battle-ships might cause her to lose command of the seas round the coast, and would endanger her very existence as a nation; while a poverty of cruisers would mean a sweeping of the country's trade from the sea—such as happened to the United States during the last great civil war—and deprivation of breadstuffs and most of the raw materials required for her manufactures. Eighty per cent. of the sea-borne trade of the world is carried in English bottoms, and a few hostile cruisers, if not immediately hunted down, would in a short time work incalculable havoc, as was proved by the operations of the Alabama (q.v.) and other Confederate cruisers. On the question whether blockade is any longer possible the opinions of experts are divided; but the majority hold that blockade has become impossible, or is attended with so many risks as to make it highly inexpedient. The experience gained during the civil war in America and the naval manoeuvres of late years would seem to show that a perfectly effective blockade is out of the question; on dark nights or in thick weather vessels will almost certainly be able to slip out unobserved, and the danger of attacks from torpedo boats will prevent the blockading squadron from keeping very close in land. The blockading ships must always have their steam ready for full speed; this entails a large consumption of fuel, and after a few days tubes and fires require cleaning. If this is not done a great falling off of speed is the result; in addition to which allowance must always be made for the absence of ships which are recoaling and readjusting their machinery. The ships blockaded labour under no such disadvantages, and have only to choose their own time for breaking out. Observation of the enemy's ports will therefore probably take the place of blockading; this being carried out by a chain of swift cruisers in touch with the main body of the fleet. The distance at which the main body should remain from the enemy's ports, and whether it should keep the sea or lie at anchor at some favourable base, are questions which the practical experience of war alone can solve. One important factor in favour of Great Britain in a naval war lies in the fact that she holds all the important Coaling Stations (q.v.), now all efficiently fortified.
A more or less formal tactical system in naval battles has existed from a very early period. The triremes or galleys of the ancients were armed with formidable iron or brass beaks; propelled by oars they were formed for attack with their bows pointing to the enemy, the aim being to destroy by an oblique blow the oars on one side of the enemy, and then ram and sink her. The earliest great battle in which the superior tactics of a numerically inferior fleet inflicted a crushing defeat on a vastly superior force was that of Salamis (480 B.C.), between the Greeks and the Persians. According to Æschylus, the Greeks were drawn up in one line, while the Persians were in three, but so crowded together that the ships had not room to manoeuvre properly; the attack of the Greeks was so impetuous that the front line of the Persians was driven back, throwing the other two lines into hopeless disorder.
In the battle of Sluys, fought 24th June 1340, the English fleet completely defeated the French. The secret of tactical success is to throw an overwhelming force, if possible, on some point of the enemy's line, and destroy him in detail. And this appears to have been done by King Edward III., who, according to Professor Laughton, successfully manoeuvred to bring his line obliquely across the right wing of the French, and completely crushed it. On the 7th October 1571 was fought the celebrated battle of Lepanto, between a combined Christian fleet under Don John of Austria and the Turks, in which the latter were completely defeated, mainly by the skilful tactical arrangements of Don John. Acting under the advice of Don Garcia de Toledo, he divided his fleet into three squadrons, which were formed in line abreast, with sufficient room between each for manoeuvring; in rear was a reserve squadron ready to give assistance where required. The bulk of the two fleets was composed of galleys; but the Venetian admiral had with him six galeasses (see GALLEYS), and before the action commenced these were placed about half a mile in advance of the fleet, two in front of each of the three divisions; the fire of these vessels, owing to their heavy ordnance, effectually broke the shock of the Turkish onset. Taking advantage of their confusion, Don John pierced their centre, and the rout of the Turks was complete, although the commanders of both the Turkish wings displayed considerable tactical skill. The Christian left wing was for a time outflanked and placed between two fires, while the Turkish left wing passed through the Christian line, and, but for the reserve squadron by which it was immediately attacked and driven back, might have altered the fate of the day. Lepanto was the last great battle in which galleys took a prominent part. With 'great ships,' dependent on their sails alone, having their guns mounted on the broadside, a new method of organising fleets for battle came into being. It was not, however, until the wars between the Dutch and English of 1652-72 that the tactical formation of a fleet in 'line of battle' was devised. Previous to this, fighting at sea appears to have been carried on in rather an indiscriminate fashion, although from the first the obtaining of the weather-gauge seems to have been recognised as the great aim for which to manoeuvre. Sir W. Monson, a distinguished sea-captain of Queen Elizabeth's time, writes: 'For the greatest advantage in a sea-fight is to get the wind of one another; for he that has the wind is out of danger of being boarded, and has the advantage where to board and how to attempt the enemy.' According to Admiral Colomb, the 'line' was first introduced by the Dutch as a means to weaken the power of fireships, and to bring the fleet under better control. The line of battle consisted in a fleet of ships being extended in a straight line either ahead or abreast one ship of another, keeping as close together as weather permitted, so that at all times every ship should be ready to sustain and relieve one another. It was directed that each ship in the line should keep within half-a-cable's length (about 50 fathoms) of one another. It was introduced into the English navy by Sir William Penn. According to Père Hoste, it was the formation taken up by both English and Dutch in the battle of the 29th July 1653, and by the Duke of York in the battle off the Texel in June 1665. But it was dropped again by Albemarle in the battle of June 1666; and, by the way Sir W. Penn speaks of it (see Pepys), it seems clear that there was still controversy as to whether a line was or was not the best formation for a fleet for fighting purposes. So, although the line was established on paper as the fighting formation soon after the outbreak of the first Dutch war, it probably did not get firm hold until the third Dutch war. However, as a recognised order of battle it was embodied in the Duke of York's fighting instructions issued in 1665. These instructions were modified by Admirals Russell and Rooke at the end of the 17th and the very beginning of the 18th century, and Rule XIX. ran: 'If the admiral and his fleet have the wind (or weather-gauge) of the enemy, and they have stretched themselves in a line of battle, the van of the admiral's fleet is to steer with the van of the enemy's, and there to engage him, each ship from van to rear successively.' It was for acting contrary to this rule that Admiral Matthews was tried by court-martial and cashiered after his indecisive action with the French off Toulon on the 22d February 1744. His fault, for which he was condemned, was breaking (or quitting) his own line with the signal for the line of battle still flying; having formed his line, he broke it himself by running down to attack the French and Spanish centre. Admiral Lestock, the second in command, refused to obey. Both were tried, and Lestock was acquitted. These instructions were still in force in 1781, when Admiral Graves fought his action off the Chesapeake on the 5th September. And on the 5th July 1782 Sir Edward Hughes, in the East Indies, tried to engage the French fleet under Suffren according to Rule XIX. when he had the chance, but failed. According to Professor Laughton, they were not issued after that time. Admiral Rodney on the English side and Suffren on the French had shown that it might be better to leave a commander-in-chief free to act as the occasion required. These instructions also made no provision for engaging from the position to leeward. It would seem that the idea in Russell's and Rooke's minds was that the fleet to windward, whichever it was, was to engage. As a matter of fact, the French never engaged in that way, and as a rule utilised the position to windward to avoid action, as in Admiral Keppel's action in 1778, and in Rodney's two actions with Guichen in May 1780. The system of tactics put in practice by Sir George Rodney in his action with the French under the Comte de Grasse on the 12th April 1782 was by a curious coincidence used on the same day by the French admiral Suffren against the English squadron under Sir E. Hughes in the East Indies, the result of which was to free British admirals' hands, leaving it to their discretion how best to attack the enemy. This was simply concentrating the attack on a part of the enemy's fleet instead of dispersing it along the whole; there was nothing new in this or in the manoeuvre by which it was effected, which was cutting through the enemy's line.
The honour of having been the first to demonstrate fully the principles on which the manoeuvres of an attack against fleets to windward or to leeward depend is generally ascribed to John Clerk (q.v.) of Eldin, who published the first edition of his Essay on Naval Tactics in 1782, and it has been asserted that Clerk had in conversation communicated to Sir C. Douglas (Rodney's flag-captain) his whole system of tactics in the year before the action with the Comte de Grasse. This has, however, been disproved by Sir Howard Douglas in his Memoir on Naval Evolutions. As a matter of fact, it is well known that the manoeuvre of cutting the enemy's line was several times performed by English commanders since the middle of the 17th century. In an action with the Dutch in 1652 Sir George Ayscue is said to have pierced the enemy's line from to leeward; and again in 1665 the Earl of Sandwich cut through the centre of the Dutch line and caused the disorder which ended in its total defeat. Again, in May 1672 Sir J. Jordan having the weather-gauge cut through the Dutch fleet and threw it into confusion. But it was unquestionably Rodney's important victory over the French in 1782 which gave the manoeuvre such notoriety. From the account of the circumstances under which on this occasion the French line was broken, it appears that the idea of the manoeuvre was at the moment suggested to the admiral by Sir Charles Douglas on perceiving an opening between two of the ships near its centre. The opportunity was seized of passing through: so narrow was the opening that the admiral's ship almost touched the French ships on each side; the ships astern followed him closely, and these kept up a powerful raking fire against the ships in the rear division of the enemy's fleet, which, being driven to leeward as the van of the British passed through, broke up and made sail before the wind to escape. At the battle of the Nile (1798) Nelson doubled on the van of the French line and attacked it on both sides, while the other ships of the line, the whole fleet being at anchor, could afford no assistance; but at Trafalgar, where his brilliant career terminated with a decisive victory, he broke the enemy's line in two places, bearing down upon it in two columns. Many persons even among naval officers have an idea that not only was Nelson no tactician, but that he despised tactics altogether; the real truth being that he was certainly the greatest tactician of his day. Before each of his great actions he had thoroughly digested and arranged the best disposition of his forces, having carefully considered every possible position in which the enemy could be found, and he made a point of discussing the different situations with his captains, so that they were all acquainted with his plans and knew what was expected of them. Steam and armour-plating have since revolutionised the conditions under which naval battles must be fought; but with the one exception of the battle of Lissa in 1866, the only action in Europe in which ironclads have been pitted against each other, there has been no naval action which affords fresh data. The Italian fleet, consisting of eleven ironclads, four frigates, and some small vessels, was bombarding Lissa, when on the morning of the 20th July 1866 the Austrian fleet was reported approaching. Persano, the Italian admiral, formed his ironclads in line of battle, standing to the north-east, nearly at right angles to the course on which the Austrians were advancing. Albini, his second in command, receiving no orders, fell back on a sort of general understanding that wooden ships should not unnecessarily engage armoured ships, and, keeping well to the rear, practically took no part in the action. Tegethoff, the Austrian admiral, advanced at full speed; his seven ironclads were formed in a double quarter line (a double oblique line), his flagship, the Ferdinand Max, leading and forming the apex of the wedge. Following in the same formation, at a distance of about 1000 yards, came seven wooden ships, an old line-of-battle ship, the Kaiser, leading in the wake of the flagship; in rear of these again came seven gun-vessels. Tegethoff's plans had all been made and explained to his captains, and as he approached the enemy he made the signal, 'Ironclads to rush against and sink the enemy.' For some reason at the last moment Persano, whose flag had been flying on board the Rè d'Italia, determined to go on board the Affondatore; so he stopped for this purpose, and, as the van in the meantime held on their course, a gap was formed in the Italian line through which the Austrians passed, the Italian rear being at the same time attacked by the Austrian wooden ships. Their centre was exposed to the concentrated attack of the seven Austrian ironclads, so that, as the result of Persano's want of skill, with a fleet of twelve ironclads against seven, the actual condition of the fight was that three were opposed to the seven and annihilated by them, one, the Rè d'Italia, being rammed and sunk, while another, the Palestro, was blown up. Had Persano's subordinates been men of energy, in spite of the disaster to their centre the Italian van and rear would have destroyed the Austrian wooden division. As it was, with the exception of the Kaiser, the Austrian ships suffered but little.
It is impossible to forecast what the issue of the next great naval action will be, or what tactics will be employed. All battle-ships are armed with formidable rams, and in the opinion of many officers ramming will be one of the features of future battles; some ships may and probably will be rammed. But on the whole it is doubtful if ramming will be so generally resorted to, as there is always the possibility of the ship ramming being herself disabled by the shock; if she misses her aim, the ship attempting to ram will probably only succeed in putting herself into position for being rammed in turn; and if an enemy's ship is disabled, to sink her will not merely be to cause a wanton loss of life, but will also be to destroy what otherwise might be a valuable prize. It is, however, certain that the ships which can open an effective fire from their secondary batteries first will have an immense advantage; and whatever the formation for attack may be, to obtain the first fire will undoubtedly be one of the objects aimed at. For the rest, the formations of a modern fleet remain pretty much what they were at the beginning of the century. A fleet is organised in two or more divisions, and each division in two subdivisions. The principal formations are single column in line ahead (the old line of battle) and in line abreast, columns of divisions in line ahead and in line abreast, and quarter or bow columns. Some years back a new formation was tried, which for a time found great favour, but has now been given up; it was called the group system, and consisted of forming ships in groups of three; each group then became a tactical unit for manœuvring purposes.
See Paul Hoste, Travail des Evolutions Navales (1690); Clerk of Eldin's Essay on Naval Tactics (1790); Captain Bainbridge-Hoff, U.S.N., Modern Naval Tactics (1885); Professor Laughton, Studies in Naval History (1887); Rear-Admiral Ammen, U.S.N., The Old Navy and the New (1891); Rear-Admiral P. H. Colomb, Naval Warfare (1891).