Blasphemy, according to the canon law, was either heretical or simple. The former consisted in denying God or an article of faith, and this was regarded as injuring the reputation of the Deity, and shocking the mysteries of religion. Simple blasphemy, on the other hand, consisted in making untrue and unbecoming statements about God, the Virgin, or the saints. These offences were severely punished both at Rome and in the Cismontane churches, though not with the capital penalty which was usual against blasphemers under the Jewish law. In England the law is partly statutory. A statute of 1698, which was repealed in 1813 so far as it protected the doctrine of the Trinity, declares it to be an offence 'to assert that there are more gods than one, to deny the Christian religion to be true, or the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments to be of divine authority.' The punishment is incapacity to hold office, and on a second conviction imprisonment for three years. Under this statute such writers as Matthew Arnold, F. W. Newman, and J. S. Mill could undoubtedly be convicted, however serious and high-minded are their books. But the prosecutions for blasphemy in England have been under the common law, and there is a difference of opinion among the highest authorities whether the simple reverent statement of certain opinions amounts to blasphemy, or whether a scoffing and contumelious spirit is not necessary to complete the offence. The older cases, such as that of Woolston who in 1728 attacked the Christian miracles, Williams who published Paine's Age of Reason in 1797, Carlisle in 1819, and Moxon who sold Shelley's Queen Mab, tend to show that, as Lord Kenyon said, 'the Christian religion is part of the law of the land,' and therefore that to question its truth, however seriously, is an offence. The theory of such convictions is much weakened by the legislation permitting jurors and witnesses to avoid the oath, for it was thought that the theological sanction of Christianity was necessary for the due administration of justice. But the more recent case of Cowan, who in 1867 proposed to lecture on 'the character and teachings of Christ; the former defective, the latter misleading,' confirms the view that blasphemy depends on the character of the matter published, not the manner in which it is stated. The opposite doctrine was laid down by Lord Coleridge in the case of Foote and Ramsay in 1883. These men were guilty of scurrilous, offensive, and even indecent caricatures of Christian doctrine, and this is the character of much of the free-thought literature of the day. The complete toleration of religious opinion which now exists renders it so improbable that any one will be prosecuted for a decent expression of disbelief in Christianity, that it is unnecessary to discuss this point further. All the definitions of blasphemy protect not merely the leading Christian dogmas and the evidences of Christianity, but also the formularies of the Church of England as by law established. It may be pointed out that, as in the case of Page Hopps, at Glasgow in 1874, Unitarian books are held not to be blasphemous at common law, and to be therefore entitled to copyright. This would seem to imply that the principle laid down in Foote's case is right. In Scotland there is also a statute law and a common law of blasphemy. The Acts of 1661 and 1695 are unrepealed, and it is still an offence punishable by fine and imprisonment to deny the authority of the Scriptures or the providence of God in the government of the world. It was under the latter statute that the atrocious judicial murder of Aikenhead, with the approval of the ministers of Edinburgh, was perpetrated in 1696. As in the case of the Edinburgh booksellers Paterson of West Register Street, and Robinson of Greenside Street, in 1843, it is a crime at common law to publish an impious book devised to ridicule or bring into contempt the Scriptures or the Christian religion. The accused in these cases were sentenced to fifteen and twelve months' imprisonment. The courts of the United States also hold that one who maliciously uses language calculated to sap the foundations of society and public order may be punished; but evil motive is essential to the offence, and discussion of religious doctrine is not to be interfered with.