Positivism, the System of Thought and Life founded by Auguste Comte (1798-1857; q. v.), is defined by him as consisting essentially of a 'philosophy and a polity which can never be discovered; the former being the basis, and the latter the end, of one comprehensive system, in which our intellectual faculties and our social sympathies are brought into close correlation with each other.' He chose the word Positive on the ground of its indicating the reality and constructive tendency which he claimed for the doctrine in its theoretical aspect, while he anticipated that in the future the term would acquire a wider meaning by suggesting also similar ideas in the sphere of feeling and action. The two primary characters of Positivism, the philosophy and the polity, were finally welded into a whole under the conception of a religion, which has for its creed the new synthesis established by the one, and for its practice the scheme of moral and social reorganisation proposed by the other. We may best consider Positivism under these three aspects.
Positive Philosophy.—Comte's primary aim was to put an end to the intellectual and social anarchy which had resulted from the destructive criticism and the revolutionary upheaval of the 18th century, by supplying an interpretation of phenomena which should organise our knowledge of the world, of man, of society, into a consistent whole. Such a universal synthesis must the new philosophy provide to form a sure basis for a new art of life.
Historical analysis revealed to Comte, as a law of mental growth, the progress of all human conceptions through three distinct phases. The primitive stage he called the theological; the transition stage, the metaphysical; and the final stage, the positive. The meanings which he attaches to these words are most concisely explained by Stuart Mill's translation of them into volitional, abstractional, experiential. The transition was effected by the gradual acceptance of the scientific method of induction from observation of phenomena as the only sound basis of explanation, all inquiry into causes other than phenomenal being finally given up as fruitless. Science, therefore, is the instrument capable of effecting the desired unity; and the problem of the positive philosophy is a threefold one: (1) to bring all knowledge within the sphere of scientific investigation; (2) to extend scientific methods through the whole territory of each division; (3) to co-ordinate the results obtained from the separate sciences, so as to approach an expression of all our knowledge in terms of a single doctrine. All three parts of this problem Comte considered to be in a large degree solved by his Classification of the Sciences.
He observed that the several classes of conceptions advanced from the theological to the positive stage with different degrees of facility, and on inquiring into the law of progression he found that the order of emancipation of the various sciences was determined by the degree of complexity and the consequent relations of dependence. A preliminary distinction was made between the abstract and the concrete sciences, the former treating separately of the general laws manifested by all the phenomena of any class, and the latter depending on these and treating of definite objects under the several aspects in which they may be viewed. The concrete sciences, Comte considered, did not yet admit of co-ordination, and he confined his classification to the abstract sciences, which he placed in the following series: (1) Mathematics; (2) Astronomy; (3) Physics; (4) Chemistry; (5) Biology; each of these drawing its data from the preceding science, and adding a new order of conceptions peculiar to itself. This series he found coincident with the sphere of knowledge then supposed to admit of scientific treatment. But there remained the phenomena of human character and society, forming a wide field of inquiry to which positive methods had never yet been applied. Certain tentative efforts had indeed been made to construct a so-called science of history—notably by Montesquieu and Condorcet—but no one before Comte had formulated the principles on which such a task might be accomplished. By his discovery of the methods proper to a rational study of social phenomena, and by his dicta—that owing to the complexity of the conditions involved, the laws of such phenomena cannot be determined a priori, but must be inductively observed, and afterwards verified and co-ordinated by deductive application of the general laws of life; that the statical condition of each historical period must be viewed in its totality, as determined by the interaction of the various classes of social factors; that intellectual evolution affords the true measure of social progress—by his enunciation of these and other doctrines Sociology was created and established in the hierarchy as the last and crowning science of the series.
The whole realm of fact was now included in the domain of positive inquiry, and Comte next addressed himself to the task of rationalising the separate departments of knowledge. In the earlier portion of this task his mathematical aptitude ensured him a large measure of success; while in biology he paved the way for further developments by his organisation of the materials then available. His main services, however, in scientific co-ordination were in the department of sociology. Besides the formal constitution which he gave to the new science, his chief substantive contribution was his enunciation of the fundamental law of intellectual development, already referred to as the cardinal doctrine of the positive philosophy. The progress of thought, moreover, from theological to positive conceptions was shown to be coincident with a progression in social action from an aggressive militarism, through a period of defensive attitude, to the final régime of industrialism. The two series of transitions are mutually dependent, our increasing knowledge of the conditions of our existence and our systematic efforts to modify them naturally reacting on each other.
The main problem of the positive philosophy, the unification of knowledge, was not yet ripe for its final solution in the days of Comte, but his classification of the sciences is regarded by his followers as affording an admirable framework for the theory of evolution advanced at a later date with the claim of supplying this want. Comte was fain to be content with the demonstration of a subjective unity in the subservience of all the sciences to the needs of man.
Positive Polity.—On the basis of the philosophy he had thus established Comte founded a scheme of individual and social conduct. The ethical portion he did not live to complete, but in his elaborate exposition of the art of social politics we have ample insight into his views on what he considered an integral part of his system. We have space here only for a bare outline.
The most complete life must be that which rests on the fullest knowledge. We naturally strive to improve those conditions of our existence which we can affect in the direction indicated by the clearer light of a new synthesis. What, then, are the evils or imperfections of our lot which may be remedied by applying positive philosophy to life? Cosmical laws are wholly beyond our direct influence, and we can only to a limited extent affect the conditions of their action. But in the science of man we ourselves are the factors, and our efforts to modify our environment form the subjective aspect of what is, objectively considered, a law of social development.
Comte believed the first requisite of systematic action to be the recognition of a central intellectual and moral authority dissociated from practical politics, which he proposed to secure by organising a Spiritual Power, consisting of philosophers, supported by the state. This class, exerting a purely moral control, yet supreme in all affairs of private and social life in virtue of its natural prestige, would have only an indirect influence on political action. The temporal power should be in the hands of capitalists, the captains of industry—chosen by their own order and naming their successors—who would feel a moral responsibility to the spiritual power, especially when the authority of the thinkers should be strengthened by the support of women and of the working-classes, whose ready adherence to positive principles Comte firmly anticipated. Besides the corrective influence of each of these powers on the other, an efficient check on despotic control on the part of either is provided in the perfect freedom of opinion and expression allowed—a freedom the more valuable that it would rest on a system of scientific and moral education, which it would be one of the chief functions of the spiritual power to direct and enforce.
With the decline of militarism and the growth of industrialism Comte foresaw that political action would in the future be mainly directed on the organisation of labour for the benefit of society at large. No idleness would be permitted; all would be workers. The distinction between the capitalists and the workmen, the rich and the relatively poor, would remain; but the former would be taught to hold their wealth and power as in trust from society to be used for the benefit of all, while the latter would also come to regard themselves as performing public functions, serving society each in his place. These views are substantially similar to such more recent economic teaching as that of Carlyle and Ruskin in Great Britain.
In the sphere of morals the main office of the spiritual power would be to strengthen the social tendencies of man at the expense of the personal, a process made possible by the development of the affections originally called forth in family life. In the sphere of intellect it should regulate and concentrate the labours of its members, putting an end to the present 'dispersive speciality' of scientific aims, and determining the direction of all intellectual efforts by reference to social needs. In pursuance of the constructive principle of Positivism Comte applies these general doctrines to the immediate future, by propounding a scheme of concerted action for a great Western Republic, embracing the French, English, German, Italian, and Spanish nations—an organisation imperfectly effected by the influence of Feudalism and Christianity.
Positivist Religion.—Such are the creed and the practice of Positivism. But a religion is more than creed and practice; there must be a sentiment, an appeal to the heart, a satisfaction of the feelings. The conception of an object of love and reverence proposed by Comte to succeed the idea of a Deity (whose existence he considered it impossible either to affirm or deny) is that of Humanity, regarded as a collective unity, a great being, consisting of all the men and women past, present, and to come, whose lives have been or shall be devoted to the well-being and progress of the race. This being, partly ideal yet wholly real, capable of being definitely conceived, and not beyond the reach of our services, would gather round it all our affections for our fellow-men; gratitude and reverence for those whose struggles and achievements in the past have made us what we are; love and sympathy for all around us who are striving after better things; hope and effort for the more perfect life of those yet unborn. Comte looked on the religion of Humanity as fulfilling all the highest aims sought by the religions of the past, and especially as succeeding naturally to Christianity, the historical value of which he thoroughly appreciated as a transitional phase of religious development. The worship of Humanity was to consist in prayer, taking the form of high resolve strengthened by effort after ideal communion with the noble spirits among the dead; and in public commemorations, for the observance of which a calendar was suggested, associating each day of the year with some great name in the roll of mankind, and arranged so as to illustrate the course of human progress. The spiritual power would carry on the traditions of the priesthoods of former religions, preaching self-abnegation as the rule of life that brings the highest happiness, and offering no reward, save a place in the 'choir invisible' of the great and good, whose names are cherished in the hearts of those who follow them, and whose influence will live to the end of time.
Positivism is of too recent origin to be adequately treated except in an account of its genesis, and the above outline of the system has therefore been entirely confined to the works of its founder. In his lifetime Comte attached to himself a body of disciples more remarkable for intellectual eminence than for numbers. The most prominent of these was M. Littré (q.v.), who afterwards edited his master's works, and established a review with the title of La Philosophie Positive. His discipleship, however, did not extend to the later developments of the system. Near the end of his life Comte founded the Positivist Society, an organisation which still has its headquarters in Paris; but it has extended to most other countries, and the number of adherents increases slowly but steadily. The Revue Occidentale, their organ in the press, is published quarterly in Paris. Among the best known of the English Positivists are Dr Congreve, Mr Frederic Harrison, Dr Bridges, and Professor Deesly, who have translated Comte's chief works and have published many expository and illustrative papers and addresses. There are two centres of Positivist activity in London, each with connections in other large towns. One of these, which is presided over by Dr Congreve, has introduced more of a ritual into its services; while the best-known group, associated chiefly with the name of Mr Frederic Harrison, and having its headquarters at Newton Hall, Fetter Lane, devotes itself mainly to extending a knowledge of the system by public addresses and various forms of practical effort.
Among sympathetic critics of Positivism are many thinkers of eminence imbued with the positive spirit, and more or less indebted to the genius of Comte. Stuart Mill, in his work on Auguste Comte and Positivism (1865), though taking an independent standpoint, speaks in terms of high appreciation not only of the leading doctrines of the positive philosophy, but also of the conception of humanity as a Grand Être, which is the keystone of the new religion. Many of the details of ritual and worship, however, were repugnant to him, as they have proved to many; and, while exaggerating the importance of these, he makes an arbitrary separation between the earlier and the later portions of Comte's career. His book should be read along with Dr Bridges' reply, entitled The Unity of Comte's Life and Doctrines (1866). Mr Herbert Spencer has taken more pains to vindicate his independence of Comte than to acknowledge his obligation to him. His references to his great predecessor mostly concern their disagreements. In two essays, one on The Genesis of Science and the other on The Classification of the Sciences, he opposes Comte's views on these subjects; and he has even thought it necessary to publish an article entitled Reasons for dissenting from the Philosophy of M. Comte. Mr Spencer's exposition of the theory of evolution is regarded by Positivists as a valuable contribution to that scientific philosophy the inauguration of which they claim for their master. G. H. Lewes, in the chapter on Comte in his History of Philosophy, calls him the greatest thinker of modern times, and declares himself an ardent adherent of the positive philosophy. For the religious aspects of Positivism, however, Lewes' feeling is one of partial sympathy only. In George Eliot's works the influence of Comte's doctrines is evident, and she has devoted one of her poems to the interpretation of the Positivist conception of immortality. In addition to the works of these writers, the following are the most important criticisms of Positivism, representing various degrees of sympathy and antagonism: John Morley, article 'Comte' in Ency. Brit.; Professor Edward Caird, Social Philosophy and Religion of Comte; Dr J. M'Cosh, Christianity and Positivism; Dr Martineau, in Types of Ethical Theory; Professor Huxley, 'Scientific Aspects of Positivism,' in Lay Sermons; and Mr A. J. Balfour, Religion of Humanity.
Among critics wholly antagonistic to Positivism are naturally to be found the theologians and so-called metaphysicians—i.e. all whose explanations of phenomena either assume the action of supernatural beings or are expressed in terms of abstractions such as vital principle, inherent tendency, nature. Such thinkers, Positivists contend, generally profess little knowledge of scientific fact; but with these may be included many scientific specialists whose contracted view of the phenomenal world unfits them for general conceptions, and leaves them open to theological and metaphysical influences beyond the immediate sphere of their own specialty. The opposition of these classes follows from the refusal of Positivism to recognise the claims of such modes of thought to other than an historical importance.