Spencer, HERBERT, who has attempted to work out a complete system of philosophy in harmony with evolution and the results of modern science, was born at Derby, 27th April 1820. His father was a schoolmaster in that town, and secretary of the Philosophical Society; and from him Spencer imbibed that love of natural science and wonderful faculty of observation so conspicuous in his works. The father was greatly interested in entomology; and Spencer himself used to collect, describe, and draw insects when a boy. Insurmountable aversion to linguistic studies put a Cambridge career out of the question, and at the age of seventeen he entered upon the profession of a railway engineer under Mr (afterwards Sir Charles) Fox, in London; but about eight years afterwards he gave up this profession, which lacked interest for him. He had already contributed various papers to the Civil Engineers' and Architects' Journal; and in the later half of 1842 he wrote a series of letters to the Nonconformist newspaper on 'The Proper Sphere of Government,' which were republished in pamphlet form in 1843. These letters imply a belief in human progress based on the modifiability of human nature through adaptation to its social surroundings, and maintain the tendency of these social arrangements 'of themselves to assume a condition of stable equilibrium.' From 1848 to 1853 he was sub-editor of the Economist newspaper; and at this time he developed the ethical and political consequences of the ideas he had already enunciated, and sought an independent basis for them. Hence his first important work, Social Statics (1850; abridged and revised, 1892). It is thus noticeable that Spencer's philosophical activity began with ethical and social questions. The conception of the evolution of man and society as determined by circumstances, and the idea that organic and social evolutions are under the same law, preceded the elaboration of those scientific ideas which, in the complete System of Philosophy, are made to serve as their basis. The truth anticipated by Harvey and Wolff, but first put into definite shape by Von Baer—'the truth that all organic development is a change from a state of homogeneity to a state of heterogeneity'—is regarded by Spencer as the organising principle of his subsequent beliefs. It was gradually developed and applied by him in a series of articles contributed in the following years to the Leader, the North British, British Quarterly, Medico-Chirurgical, Westminster, and other reviews.
In these essays, especially those on The Development Hypothesis (1852), Manners and Fashion (1854), The Genesis of Science (1854), and Progress: its Law and Cause (1857), and in the volume of Principles of Psychology (1855), the doctrine of evolution began to take definite form, and to be applied to various departments of inquiry. The publication of Darwin's Origin of Species, in 1859, gave a wide basis of scientific proof for what had hitherto been matter of speculation, and first showed the important part played by natural selection in the development of organisms.
In 1864 Spencer published an essay on the Classification of the Sciences, in which he criticised Comte's serial arrangement of the sciences according to generality, and substituted for it a classification according to abstractness: (1) Abstract Science, treating of the forms (space and time) in which phenomena are known to us—logic and mathematics; (2) Abstract-concrete Science, treating of the laws of the factors of the phenomena themselves—mechanics, physics, chemistry, &c.; (3) Concrete Science, treating of the phenomena in their totalities (the laws of the products)—astronomy, geology, biology, psychology, sociology, &c.
Upon this scheme of the sciences Spencer had now been working for several years. As early as 1860 he had announced the issue of a System of Synthetic Philosophy, already in course of preparation, which, beginning with the first principles of all knowledge, proposed to trace how the law of evolution was gradually realised in life, mind, society, and morality. In pursuance of this comprehensive design Spencer has published First Principles (1862); Principles of Biology (2 vols. 1864-67); Principles of Psychology (2d ed. 2 vols. 1870-72); Principles of Sociology (3 vols. 1876-96); Principles of Ethics (2 vols. 1879). In the preface to the third vol. of the Sociology (1896) completing the Synthetic Philosophy, the author explained that the two volumes of the original design had expanded to three; a fourth (Linguistic, Intellectual, Moral, Aesthetic) must remain unwritten by reason of age and infirmity.
These works follow a different plan from his earlier writings. In his occasional essays already referred to he proceeded by means of observation and induction; and in them the law of evolution was the result of a generalisation. But the method of his System is deductive; though the deductions, large and small, are always accompanied by inductive verifications. Even the law of evolution only finds a place in it because it can be deduced from a higher and ultimate principle. Just as certain special sciences—mechanics, for example—have already entered into the deductive stage, so, in Spencer's System, completely co-ordinated knowledge, to which he gives the name of philosophy, becomes deductive. Hence the importance of determining what is the ultimate test of truth. This, according to him, is the mental inconceivability of the negation of the proposition by the individual thinker. The validity of this test is supported, according to him, by two considerations: first, because no other test is obtainable, and secondly, by the consideration that mental inconceivability is the result of certain uniformities in our experience which are due to uniformities in nature. His appeal to this test, and the way in which he employs it, formed the subject of a controversy with J. S. Mill, and brings out the distinction between his method and principles and those of the empirical philosophy.
Metaphysically, Spencer's system is founded on the doctrine of relativity deduced by Hamilton and Mansel from Kant, but carried by him, as he says, a step further. Along with the definite consciousness of things known in relation to one another there is implied an indefinite consciousness of an absolute existence, in the recognition of which as inscrutable science and religion find their reconciliation. All definite consciousness or knowledge is of the manifestations of this unknowable power; and knowledge, completely unified, is philosophy. The data of philosophy are necessarily those organised components of our intelligence without which philosophising could not go on. 'Our postulates are: an unknowable power; the existence of knowable likenesses and differences among the manifestations of that power; and a resulting segregation of the manifestations into those of subject and object.' Within each segregated mass there are likenesses and differences involving secondary segregations. The modes of cohesion under which manifestations are invariably presented are called, when contemplated apart, space and time; when contemplated along with their manifestations, matter and motion. All these are traceable to experiences of that mode of consciousness whose reality is shown by its persistence—to force. By the 'persistence of force' is meant the unchanging quantity both of that mode of force which is revealed to us only by opposition to our own powers, and is not a worker of change, and of that mode which is a worker of change actual or potential, and is specifically termed energy. The persistence of force—i.e. the persistence of some cause which transcends our knowledge and conception—is the truth which all other truths imply, and from which they all (including the law of evolution) are derived. From the fact that force can neither arise out of nor lapse into nothing follows the uniformity of law. Force never disappears; it is only transformed. Motion follows the line of least resistance, and is perpetually reversed within limits—is rhythmical. So far of the factors of phenomena. The phenomena themselves must be under a law of the concomitant redistribution of matter and motion, which holds of every change. The law of the entire cycle of changes passed through by every existence is loss of motion and consequent integration—i.e. evolution, eventually followed by gain of motion and consequent disintegration—i.e. dissolution. In its complete shape the 'formula of evolution' is thus stated: 'Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion; during which the matter passes from an indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity; and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation.' This law of evolution applies equally to all orders of phenomena—'astronomic, geologic, biologic, psychologic, sociologic, &c.'—since these are all component parts of one cosmos, though distinguished from one another by conventional groupings. So long as evolution is merely established by induction it does not belong to philosophy. It must be deduced from the persistence of force. And this can be done. For any finite aggregate being unequally exposed to surrounding forces will become more diverse in structure; every differentiated part will become the parent of further differences; at the same time, dissimilar units in the aggregate tend to separate, and those which are similar to cluster together ('segregation'); and this subdivision and dissipation of forces, so long as there are any forces unbalanced by opposite forces, must end at last in rest; the penultimate stage of this process, 'in which the extremest multiformity and most complex moving equilibrium are established,' being the highest conceivable state.
The various derivative laws of phenomenal changes are thus deducible from the persistence of force, and it remains to apply them to inorganic, organic, and super-organic existences. The detailed treatment of inorganic evolution is omitted from Spencer's plan (which is, he remarks, even too extensive without it), and he proceeds 'to interpret the phenomena of life, mind, and society, in terms of matter, motion, and force.'
It is impossible to give here any but the most general idea of the contents of the volumes in which the law of evolution is applied to these different departments. It is not only made to account for the phenomena within each group, but also for the connection between one science and another. The researches of Darwin had accumulated ample material for showing the continuity of development, structural and functional, in plants and animals; and Spencer's view of biology, and the definition of life he proposes ('the definite combination of heterogeneous changes both simultaneous and successive in correspondence with external co-existences and sequences'), are meant to show its connection both with inorganic changes on the one hand and with mind on the other. Now, just as biology has to deal with the connection between phenomena in the organism, and as physical science treats of the connection between phenomena in the environment, so psychology has to do with the connection between these two connections. For this is said to be the objective aspect of what states of consciousness are subjectively. The functions dealt with by the psychologist are more special than those dealt with by the biologist; but they belong to psychology, not merely because they are more special, but also because they are the counterparts of the states of consciousness dealt with by the science of subjective psychology.
Objectively, an attempt is made to trace the evolution of mind from reflex action through instinct to reason, memory, feeling, and will, by the inter-action of the nervous system with its environment. Subjectively, mental states are analysed, and it is contended that all of them—including those primary scientific ideas, the perceptions of matter, motion, space, and time, assumed in the First Principles—can be analysed into a primitive element of consciousness, something which can only be defined as analogous to a nervous shock. These perceptions have now become innate in the individual. They may be called—as Kant called space and time—forms of intuition; but they have been acquired empirically by the race, through the persistence of the corresponding phenomena in the environment, and from the accumulated experiences of each individual being transmitted in the form of modified structure to his descendants.
This principle of heredity is one of the laws by which individuals are connected with one another into an organic whole; and we thus pass quite naturally to what Spencer calls super-organic evolution, implying the co-ordinated actions of many individuals, and giving rise to the science of sociology. Society, like an individual man, is shown to be an organism from the fact and laws of its growth, the nature of its activities, and the inter-dependence of its parts; though it is distinguished from the individual organism in this, that it is discrete, while the latter is concrete: 'there is no social sensorium.' As societies progress in size and structure, they work on one another profound metamorphoses, now by wars, struggles and now by industrial intercourse.
Assisted by a series of elaborate ethnographical charts (Descriptive Sociology) prepared under his direction, Spencer has attempted to trace the development of human ideas, customs, ceremonial usages, and political institutions. The genesis of religion is traced to Ancestor-worship (q.v.), or generally to worship of the dead. The notion of another life—from which the notions of gods and God are gradually evolved—is originated mainly by 'such phenomena as shadows, reflections, and echoes—these being looked upon as indications of a 'double' or other self, which is not extinguished with the death of the first self. It is this fear of the dead which is the root of the religious control, just as it is the fear of the living which is the root of the political control. Ceremonies and institutions alike have their root in this fear of the stronger and submission to the conqueror. Thus, early communities being of the predatory or militant type, tended to centralised control; while industrial communities, which are now most frequent, should tend to free institutions and to the restriction of the sphere of government to the negative duty of preventing the interference of one individual with his neighbour's liberty. This principle of government—commonly expressed by the maxim laissez faire—is energetically enforced by Spencer, against the tendency of much recent legislation. A still higher type than the industrial is possible in the future, by inverting the belief that life is for work into the belief that work is for life; just as the industrial type inverts the belief that individuals exist for the state into the belief that the state exists for individuals.
The principles of morality are looked on by Spencer as the copestone of his system, all his other investigations being only preliminary to them. Ethics, he holds, has its root in physical, biological, psychological, and social phenomena, for by them the conditions of human activity are prescribed and supplied. The best conduct is that which most fully realises evolution—which promotes the greatest totality of life in self, offspring, and the race—the balance of egoism and altruism being attained by a compromise between these contending principles. The measure of life is said to be pleasure, but the Utilitarian school are at fault in assuming that the end (greatest happiness) is better known than the means to it (morality); and in ignoring the fact that accumulated experiences of utility have become consolidated in the superior races into a moral sense.
In the above summary it has been impossible to give any idea of either the strength or weakness of the proof by which this elaborate system is supported. In general, it may be said that its strength lies in the author's brilliant power of generalisation, his acquaintance with many departments of science, and his unsurpassed wealth of illustration. The wide knowledge which all his writings display of physical science, and his constant endeavour to illustrate and support his system by connecting its positions with scientific facts and laws, have given his philosophy great currency among men of science—more so, indeed, than among philosophical experts. At the same time, not only have the development and application he has given to the theory of evolution profoundly influenced contemporary speculation and the recent developments of psychology and ethics, but he must also be regarded as one of the very few modern thinkers who have carried out the attempt to give a systematic account of the universe in its totality. The high opinion of his writings formed by foreign contemporaries has led to many academic honours being pressed upon him, which have, however, all alike been declined.
Spencer's most popular works have been a small volume on Education (1861), which has been translated into many languages, and The Study of Sociology (1872), which points out to the unscientific reader the difficulties of a social science. He has also written The Man versus the State (1884), and The Factors of Organic Evolution (1887). His occasional papers have been collected and published in three volumes of Essays: Scientific, Political, and Speculative. An Epitome of the Synthetic Philosophy, by F. Howard Collins, was published with Mr Spencer's authority in 1889 (1 vol.); there are criticisms of the system by Guthrie (1879 and 1882) and McCosh (New York, 1885); and the Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy, by John Fiske (2 vols. Boston, 1874), is based on Spencer's system. See also Fischer, Ueber das Gesetz der Entwicklung (1875); Michelet, Spencers System der Philosophie (1882), and Spencers Lehre (Leipzig, 1891); A. D. White, Herbert Spencer: The Completion of the Synthetic Philosophy (1897).