Statutes. A statute expresses the will of the legislature. It takes effect from the first moment of the day of its passing. Except in Scotland, it remains in force though obsolete; and when repealed it is not revived by the repeal of the repealing act. It is always to be construed 'according to the intent of them that made it.' Primarily, technical words are understood in their technical, other words in their popular sense. When precise and free from ambiguity, they receive their literal meaning and grammatical construction, whatever may be thought of the wisdom or policy of the enactment. But language is so imperfect, and general words are so elastic and open to such varieties of meaning and force, that the literal construction often does not express the real intention. Where such a doubt arises it is necessary to consider what was the earlier law, what its defect, and what the proposed remedy and its object; in other words, to examine the history of the act and the context. The whole act is read, every part in the sense best harmonising with the rest. The preamble is especially invoked to explain what is doubtful. Earlier acts, though expired or repealed, and even later ones on the same or analogous subject, are resorted to, also, for light. The title, marginal notes, and punctuation are disregarded, and so are all statements of members of the Houses and draftsmen as to what was intended.
The scope and object of the act being thus ascertained, it generally receives a beneficial construction which best 'suppresses the mischief and advances the remedy.' Sometimes words receive an unusual stretch of meaning; for instance, a married woman living apart from her husband would be included in the expression a 'single woman,' where the object of the act was to give the mother of an illegitimate child a claim on the father for its support. So a generic term usually includes species which did not exist when the act was passed. Thus, an act of George II. against copying copyright engravings includes photographic copies, and one of William IV. against 'furious driving' applies to bicycles, though photography and bicycles were not then known. In the same spirit all devices resorted to for evading a law, or misusing powers which it conferred, are defeated by including such attempts within it.
To give effect to the intention expressions are sometimes strained; for instance, 'beyond the seas' is read in an old act as equivalent to 'out of the British dominions.' Sometimes the collocation of the words is altered, or they are rejected altogether, or even words are interpolated. But such modifications are made only when obviously necessary in correction of a careless text which did not make sense or was incomplete as it stood.
Beneficial construction is applied less freely to penal acts. There is a reluctance to supply in them the defects of language, or to eke out their meaning by doubtful inferences. Where a word or phrase is open to reasonable doubt, the benefit of the doubt is given to the subject. An omission, also, would probably not be supplied; but the extreme strictness of construction of former times has now materially given way to the paramount rule that a statute is to be expounded according to the real intention. Acts which impose on the subject burdens or formalities, or otherwise restrict natural liberty, or create monopolies, or confer privileges are construed in the same spirit as penal acts. The language of local and personal acts, which invest persons or bodies with rights and privileges for their own profit or interfere with the rights of others, is regarded as rather that of its promoters than of the legislature, and is consequently construed most strongly against them.
Certain constructions are always rejected, if the language can admit it. Any which would lead to inconvenience and injustice or absurdity would be avoided as probably foreign to the real intention. For this reason a construction which made an act operate retrospectively on vested rights would be avoided; and so would any which conflicted with international law—a construction, for instance, which extended a criminal statute to a foreigner for an offence committed abroad. Again, an act would not be read as affecting the prerogative rights or property of the crown, unless the intention was plainly expressed or irresistibly inferable. A like reluctance is felt to attribute an intention to oust the jurisdiction of the superior courts, or to extend that of new or inferior tribunals and authorities.
If two statutes, or two passages in one, are contradictory, the earlier is abrogated by implication. But, as self-contradiction was probably not intended, such a construction is rejected unless inevitable, or unless there be inconvenience or incongruity in both enactments being in force, or the later would be inoperative if the earlier was not repealed. Special and local acts are unaffected by general acts inconsistent with them, being regarded as not in the contemplation of the legislature when making the general act.
Another and most important axiom is that no change of the law is intended beyond the specific object immediately in view. Words and phrases, therefore, however comprehensive literally, are so restricted as not to affect any general principles of law. An act, for example, which empowered 'any' justice to try a case would not include a justice who was incapacitated by interest or otherwise from trying it. To confine an act to its immediate object, it is often construed as operative only between certain persons, or under certain circumstances, or for certain purposes only. Thus, an act which made a bill for money lost at play 'void to all intents and purposes' would not affect the validity of the bill in the hands of an innocent indorsee for value, but would apply to it only when in the hands of the drawer or of others with no better title.
It follows that incidents are sometimes found imported into an act which give it an operation different from its strictly grammatical meaning. Thus, where a power is conferred, everything in the way both of right and obligation which is indispensable to its due exercise is tacitly included by law. When, therefore, a statute enacts that a public officer 'may' do some act of a judicial or public nature, it also by implication directs that he 'must' exercise the power whenever the occasion arises; and if its exercise may prejudice a person, it involves the further duty of first giving the latter an opportunity of being heard against it.
When a statute grants a right subject to certain formalities, compliance with such prescriptions is essential on pain of invalidation. But when the prescriptions relate to a public duty, and invalidation for neglect would be unjust to persons who have no control over the defaulting official, without promoting the object of the act, non-compliance does not invalidate. In the former case the act is imperative, in the latter directory only. A penalty for doing something implies a prohibition; this makes the prohibited act unlawful; and all contracts connected with illegal acts are void.
There are some minor rules of interpretation which hardly call for notice here. Some will be found in the Act 52 and 53 Vict. chap. 63. But it may be mentioned, in conclusion, that usage, or a long and general public or professional practice, sometimes impresses on an enactment a meaning not in accord with the natural sense of the words, but which is nevertheless accepted as conclusive.