Stoicism, a school of ancient philosophy, strongly opposed to Epicureanism in its views of human life and duty. The Stoical system dates from the end of the 4th century B.C.; though commonly said to have been derived from the system of the Cynics, it is noteworthy that few of its founders or early apostles were born in Greece; it is the joint produce of Hellas and the Orient, and it was in Rome rather than in Greece that it most profoundly influenced civilisation.
The founder of the system was Zeno, from Cittium in Cyprus (340-260 B.C.), who derived his first impulse from Crates the Cynic. He opened his school in a colonnade called the Stoa Poikilē ('Painted Porch') at Athens, which was adorned with pictures of the Trojan war, Marathon, and the Amazons by Polygnotus; hence the name of the sect. Zeno had for his disciple Cleanthes, from Assos in the Troad (300-220), whose Hymn to Jupiter is the only fragment of any length that has come down to us from the early Stoics—a poem setting forth the unity of God, his omnipotence, and his moral government. Chrysippus, from Soli in Cilicia (280-207), followed Cleanthes, and in his voluminous writings both defended and modified the Stoical creed. Antiquity gave by far the most important position to Chrysippus: 'Without Chrysippus there had been no Porch;' recent German criticism has done much to discover how much of the system is due to each. And Pearson sums up his elaborate investigation as follows: 'The result of our investigation has been to show conclusively that all those doctrines which are most characteristic of the true essence of Stoicism were contributed by Zeno and Cleanthes. To Zeno belong the establishment of the logical criterion, the adaptation of Heraclitean physics, and the introduction of all the leading ethical tenets. Cleanthes revolutionised the study of physics by the theory of tension and the development of pantheism, and by applying his materialistic views to logic and ethics brought into strong light the mutual interdependence of the three branches. The task of Chrysippus was to preserve rather than to originate, to reconcile inconsistencies, to remove superfluous outgrowths, and to maintain an unbroken line of defence against his adversaries.' These three represent the first period of the system. The second period (200-50) embraces its general promulgation, and its introduction to the Romans. Chrysippus was succeeded by Zeno of Sidon, and Diogenes of Babylon; then followed Antipater of Tarsus, who taught Panætius of Rhodes, who, again, taught Posidonius of Apamea, in Syria. Posidonius was acquainted with Marius and Pompey, and taught Cicero; but the moral treatise of Cicero, De Officiis, is derived from a work of Panætius. The third period of Stoicism is Roman. In this period we have Cato the Younger, who invited to his house the philosopher Athenodorus; and, under the Empire, the three Stoic philosophers whose writings have come down to us—Seneca, Epictetus, and the Emperor Marcus Aurelius. Stoicism prevailed widely in the Roman world, although not to the exclusion of Epicurean views.
The leading Stoical doctrines are given in certain phrases or expressions, as 'life according to nature,' the ideal 'wise man,' 'apathy,' or equanimity of mind, the power of the 'will,' the worship of 'duty,' the constant 'advance' in virtue, &c. But the system will be best considered under four heads—the Theology; the Psychology; the theory of the Good; and the scheme of Virtue.
(1) The Stoics held that the universe is governed by one good and wise God. According to Epictetus, God is the father of men; Marcus Aurelius exults in the beautiful arrangement of all things. They did not admit that the Deity intermeddled in the smaller details of life; they allowed that omens and oracles might be accepted as signs of the foreordained arrangement of God. They held this forcoordination even to the length of fatalism, and made the same replies as have been given in modern times to the difficulty of reconciling it with Free-will. God is the author of all things except wickedness; the very nature of good supposes its contrast evil, and the two are inseparable, like light and dark; in the enormous extent of the universe some things must be neglected; when evil happens to the good, it is not as a punishment, but as connected with a different dispensation; parts of the world may be presided over by evil demons; what we call evil may not be evil. Like most other ancient schools, the Stoics held God to be corporeal like man; body is the only substance; nothing incorporeal could act on what is corporeal; the first cause of all, God or Zeus, is the primeval fire, emanating from which is the soul of man in the form of a warm ether. Their theory of the universe may in fact be described as a materialistic pantheism. It is for human beings to recognise the universe as governed by universal law, and not only to raise their minds to the comprehension of it, but to enter into the views of the Creator, who must regard all interests equally; man should be, as it were, in league with Him, merge self in the universal order, think only of that and its welfare. By this elevation of view we are necessarily raised far above the consideration of the petty events befalling ourselves. The grand effort of human reason is thus to rise to the abstraction or totality of entire nature. The Stoics held the theory of the absorption of the individual soul at death into the divine essence; but, on the other hand, their doctrine of advance and aspiration is what has in all times been the main natural argument for the immortality of the soul. For the most part they kept themselves undecided as to immortality, giving it as an alternative, but reasoning as to our conduct on either supposition, and submitting to the pleasure of God in this as in all other things. In arguing for the existence of divine power and government they employed what has been called the argument from design.
(2) As to the constitution of the mind, they held that men have bodies like animals, but reason or intelligence like the gods. Animals have instinctive principles of action; man alone has a rational, intelligent soul. According to Marcus Aurelius, we come into contact with Deity by our intellectual part, and our highest life is thus the divine life.
But the most important Stoical doctrine respecting the nature of man is the recognition of reason as a superior power or faculty that subordinates all the rest—the governing intelligence. This, however, is not a mere intellectual principle, but an active force, uniting intellect and will. The bodily sensibilities are opposed to this higher reason and will, which, however, is strong enough to control them. Another way of expressing the same view was the power of the mind over the body, which was dwelt upon by Epictetus in the most exaggerated form. (The assertion of a doctrine so obviously contrary to the fact as that sickness may affect the body without enfeebling the mind could only end in practical failure, or else in contradiction.) In Seneca we find something very closely approaching to the Christian doctrine of the corruption of human nature. The littleness of humanity was a favourite theme of Marcus Aurelius, and naturally followed from the Stoical mode of contemplating the universe at large. The doctrine called the freedom of will may be said to have originated with the Stoics, although with them it was chiefly a rhetorical mode of expressing the dignity of the wise man, and his power of rising superior to circumstances. To prepare the way for the Stoical precepts Epictetus distinguished between things in our power and things not in our power. The things in our power are our opinions and notions about objects, and all our affections, desires, and aversions; the things not in our power are our bodies, wealth, honour, rank, authority, &c. Wealth and high rank may not be in our power, but we have the power to form an idea of these—viz. that they are unimportant, whence the want of them will not grieve us. A still more pointed application is to death, whose force is entirely in the idea.
(3) The Good was not by the Stoics identified with happiness. Happiness is not necessary, and may be dispensed with, and pain is no evil. Pains are in a sense an evil, but, by a proper discipline, may be triumphed over. They disallowed the direct and ostensible pursuit of pleasure as an end (the point of view of Epicurus), but allured their followers partly by promising them the victory over pain, and partly by the lofty enjoyments that grew out of their plan of life. Pain of every kind, whether from the casualties of existence or from the severity of the Stoical virtues, was to be met by a discipline of endurance. Great stress was laid on the instability of pleasure, and the constant liability to accidents; whence we should always be anticipating and adapting ourselves to the worst that could happen, so as never to be in a state where anything could ruffle the mind. Much might still be made of the worst circumstances—poverty, banishment, public odium, sickness, old age. Such a discipline was peculiarly suited to the unsettled condition of the world at the time, when any man, besides the ordinary evils of life, might in a moment be sent into exile, or sold into slavery. Moreover, it is a discipline adapted to a certain class of dispositions existing in all ages—men who prefer above all things 'equanimity' of mind, and would rather dispense with great occasional pleasures than risk their state of habitual composure. Next to the discipline of endurance we must rank the complacent sentiment of pride, which the Stoic might justly feel in his conquest of himself. It was usual to bestow the most extravagant laudation on the 'wise man,' and every Stoic could take this home to the extent that he considered himself as approaching that great ideal. The last and most elevated form of Stoical happiness was the satisfaction of contemplating the universe and God. The work of Marcus Aurelius is full of studies of nature in the devout spirit of 'passing from nature to nature's God;' he is never weary of expressing his thorough contentment with the course of natural events, and his sense of the beauties and fitness of everything. Old age has its grace, and death is the becoming termination. This high strain of exulting contemplation reconciled him to that complete submission to whatever might befall which was the essential feature of the 'life according to nature.'
(4) The Stoical theory of virtue is implicated in their ideas of the good. The fountain of all virtue is manifestly the life according to nature, as being the life of subordination of self to more general interests—to family, country, mankind, the whole universe. The Stoics were the first to preach what is called 'Cosmopolitanism;' for although, in their reference to the good of the whole, they confounded together sentient life and inanimate objects—rocks, plants, &c., solicitude for which was misspent labour—yet they were thus enabled to reach the conception of the universal brotherhood of mankind, and could not but include in their regards the brute creation. They said, 'There is no difference between Greeks and Barbarians; the world is our city.' Seneca urges kindness to slaves, for 'are they not men like ourselves, breathing the same air, living and dying like ourselves?' The Epicureans declined, as much as possible, interference in public affairs, but the Stoical philosophers all urged men to the duties of active citizenship. Although there had been many good and noble men among the pagans, yet positive beneficence had not been preached as a virtue before the Stoics. They adopted the four cardinal virtues (wisdom, or the knowledge of good and evil; justice; fortitude; temperance) as part of their plan of the virtuous life. Justice, as the social virtue, was placed above all the rest; but most interesting to us are the indications of the idea of beneficence. Epictetus is earnest in his exhortations to forgiveness of injuries. Marcus Aurelius often enforces the same virtue; he contends as strongly as Butler and Hume for the existence of a principle of pure—that is, unselfish—benevolence in the mind. There is also in the Stoical system a recognition of duties to God, and of morality as based on piety. Not only are we all brethren, but also the 'children of one Father.'
The extraordinary stress put upon human nature by the full Stoic ideal of submerging self in the larger interests of being led to various compromises. The rigid following out of the ideal issued in a series of the Paradoxes—viz. that all the actions of the wise man are equally perfect, and that, short of the standard of perfection, all faults and vices are equal; that, for example, the man that killed a cock without good reason was as guilty as he that killed his father. The idea of duty was of Stoical origin, fostered and developed by the Roman spirit and legislation. The early Stoic had two different words for the 'suitable' (kathēkon) and the 'right' (katorthōma). It was a great point with the Stoic to be conscious of 'advance,' or improvement. By self-examination he kept himself constantly acquainted with his moral state, and it was both his duty and his satisfaction to be approaching to the ideal of the perfect man. The Stoical system has largely tinctured modern ages, in spite of its severity. It has always had a charm as an ideal, even when men were conscious of not realising it. The limitation of wants, the practice of contentment, the striving after equanimity, the hardening of one's self against the blows of fortune are all fundamental maxims with the moralists of later ages; and a qualified form of the subordination of self to the general welfare is an essential part of most modern theories of virtue.
The chief ancient authorities on the Stoics are the writings of Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, and Seneca, themselves Stoic philosophers, together with notices occurring in Cicero, Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus, Diogenes Laertius, and Stobæus. The completest modern account of the system occurs in Zeller's Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics (Eng. trans. 1870). See also Sir Alexander Grant in the Oxford Essays for 1858; Farrar's Seckers after God (1868; 3d ed. 1891); Rev. W. W. Capes, Stoicism (1880); J. Jordan, Stoic Moralists (1880); Ogereau, Le Système des Stoïciens (1885); A. C. Pearson, The Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes (1891); and works cited at AURELIUS, EPICTETUS, SENECA.