Eclecticism. The term eclectic (from Gr. eklegein, 'to choose,' 'select') was first applied in philosophy to certain Greek thinkers in the 2d and 1st centuries B.C. Stoicism and Epicureanism had subordinated the search for pure truth to that for happiness and practical virtue: Scepticism had denied that such truth could be found: Eclecticism was the attempt to reach the highest probability by selection from the already existing systems of philosophy. It arose from despair of attaining absolute truth, and from the desire for knowledge which should suffice for guidance in action. Panætius and Posidonius (later Stoics), Carneades (of the new Academy), Philo of Larissa are the chief early representatives of eclectic thought in later Greek philosophy. Philosophic eclecticism had appeared in the Sophists about the middle of the 5th century B.C. It was here also associated with, and sprang immediately from, scepticism, with which was combined a certain dogmatic tendency. Plato and Aristotle were eclectic only in a very wide meaning of the term, for the philosophic genius of each was original, and their concern for pure truth was very intense.
The chief causes of Roman eclectic philosophy were similar to those of eclecticism in Greece. Philosophic speculation was ill suited to the practical Roman mind, which was content with the most easily found explanation of man and the universe. Cicero's philosophic writings (46-43 B.C.) are chiefly ethic. They express only probable truth, and, to a large extent, like the philosophy of the Sophists, reflect what was common to all popular opinion. Cicero had studied with Epicurean, Stoic, and Sceptic teachers, and tried to unite Peripatetic, Stoic, and Sceptic doctrines. His friend Varro developed his views with greater knowledge of the history of philosophy. In the following century Seneca, the Stoic, propounded a scheme of philosophy much of which was eclectic, and most of which was determined by ethical considerations.
The last period of Greek philosophy—i.e. in the 2d and 1st centuries B.C., was characterised by a weak eclecticism—viz. that of the Neo-Pythagoreans, the Pythagorean Platonists, and the Platonic Stoics. In the 1st century B.C. a new eclecticism appeared at Alexandria, the chief representative of which was Philo, a Jew (perhaps about 25 B.C. to 45 A.D.), who interpreted the Old Testament in an allegoric sense, and in harmony with selected doctrines of Greek philosophy. These, in turn, were modified so as to remove their inconsistency with the sacred writings. He was directly indebted to Pythagorean, Platonic, Peripatetic, and Stoic schools for much of his thought. Neoplatonism, the last product of Greek speculation, was not syncretic, for it sifted and transformed the principles which it borrowed from other systems. Its fundamental doctrine of ecstasy, or immediate knowledge of God, in which the distinction of the human soul from the divine reason is completely removed, differs greatly from preceding similar theories both Greek and Oriental. It was a fusion of Greek philosophy with Oriental religion in which, however, the first element greatly predominated. The principal exponents of this philosophy are Plotinus (205-270), Porphyry (233 to about 302), Iamblichus (died about 330), and Proclus (410-484). Its purpose was religious—viz. the attainment of right relations between God and man.
There was much eclecticism in the earliest Christian philosophy. Among the Fathers of the Church Clement of Alexandria and his pupil Origen were greatly influenced by their study of Greek philosophy in Alexandria, and Christian scholasticism was pervaded by an eclectic spirit. Eclecticism was naturally a chief factor in the philosophy which immediately followed the revival of learning. It appears towards the end of the 13th century in the works of Meister Eckhardt in
Germany, and in those of G. Bruno and Campanella in Italy in the 16th century. In Leibnitz (1646-1716) it becomes strictly scientific. He wove into his philosophy materials from widely separated sources—e.g. from Aristotle and from Descartes. Like Hegel and Cousin, he regarded the tenets which he adopted as being imperfect in the systems from which they were taken, but as capable of being made parts of one harmonious whole in which pure truth would be completely realised. He tried to unify principles which should be applied and developed in future systems, and to find a method which philosophers of diverse schools could employ in common. Perhaps it is in the effort to establish such a method, that philosophic eclecticism produces its best results. The followers of Leibnitz, C. Wolf (1679-1754) and his school, degraded the eclecticism of their master into a popular, dogmatic, fixed, and formal body of doctrine. Kant and Hegel are only eclectic in the sense in which Plato and Aristotle are so. Each seeks first, through criticism, to establish his fundamental principles. The greatest modern eclectic philosopher is Victor Cousin (1792-1867). He was the pupil of Royer-Collard and Maine de Biran, through whom he became acquainted, respectively, with Scotch philosophy and the sensationalism of Locke and Condillac. He was particularly guided by the philosophy of Scotland and Germany, although he sought to discover the common and permanent elements in all preceding schemes of thought. His principle of selection was supplied by his psychologic analysis, which, however, was somewhat superficial. Cousin's school in France was large and influential. Its most distinguished members were Theodore Jouffroy and B. Saint-Hilaire.
There is a strongly eclectic tendency in the recent philosophic movement in Italy of which Count Mamiani was the head, and which the historian of philosophy, Vera, has most effectually supported. It is only provisionally that eclecticism can aid philosophic research, for systems may arise in which psychologic investigation, or historic interpretation, or metaphysical speculation, reveals new truth. What is common to all philosophy in one age will cease to be so in another, and reality must be sought not merely for its own sake, but by the original exercise of the individual intellect.