Napoleon I., emperor of the French. Napoleon Bonaparte, the second son of Charles Bonaparte and his wife Letizia de Ramolino, was born at Ajaccio, in Corsica, on the 15th August 1769. In 1779 he entered the Royal Military School of Brienne le Château; there he remained till the autumn of 1784, when he was transferred to the Military School of Paris, according to the usual routine. An official report on him by the Inspector of Military Schools in this year speaks highly of his conduct, and notifies his great proficiency in mathematics and fair knowledge of history and geography, but says he is not well up in ornamental studies or in Latin, and, curiously enough, adds that he will make an excellent sailor. Napoleon lost his father in 1785, and the same year he was commissioned as second-lieutenant of artillery, in which capacity he served at Valence and other garrisons. He spent his periods of leave in Corsica, and appears to have wished to play the leading part in the history of his native island, showing the first signs of his ambitious and energetic character. During the critical times following the first French Revolution, he at first joined the moderate party of Paoli; but, trying for military power, though by untiring activity and reckless audacity he succeeded in being elected lieutenant-colonel of the National Volunteers of Ajaccio, he failed in an attempt to seize that town and was obliged to return to France. Although he had forfeited his French commission by overstaying his leave, the second Revolution of 1792 was now in progress, and the new government could not spare the few trained officers whom emigration had left, and his rank was restored to him. He returned to Corsica and accompanied an expedition which unsuccessfully tried to get possession of Sardinia. The French government soon made an endeavour to crush Paoli and do away with Corsican privileges, and the islanders rallied round the patriot. Napoleon now turned against him and attempted to seize the citadel of Ajaccio for the French; but failing again, with all his relatives he fled a second time to France.
From this time onwards Napoleon looked to France for his career. The narrow horizon of his native island was no longer wide enough for him, but from its bracing mountain air and from the quick blood of his race he drew a magnetic force which imparted to his decisions and actions a rapidity and energy that carried all before them, while at the same time a power of calm calculation, of industry, and of self-control enabled him to employ his genius to the best advantage. The force of his personality was so overwhelming that in considering his career the regret must ever be present that the only principle that remained steadfast with him, and is the key to his conduct throughout, should have been the care for his own advancement, glory, and power. Napoleon now joined the army under Carteaux, which acted against the Marseillais who had declared against the National Convention and occupied Avignon. At this time he became attached to the younger Robespierre, who was a commissioner with the army, and embraced his Jacobin principles. He was shortly promoted Chef de Bataillon, and commanded the artillery at the siege of Toulon, where he highly distinguished himself, and is generally believed to have been the author of the plan of attack which led to the fall of the place. He was then promoted general of brigade.
On the fall of the Robespierres, Napoleon incurred serious danger, but was saved by powerful influence enlisted in his favour. He was, however, ordered to take command of an infantry brigade in the Army of the West. This he considered would stifle his military career, and neglecting to obey the order, he was in consequence removed from the list of employed general officers. Disgusted with his apparent lack of prospects, he was now anxious to be sent to Turkey to re-organise the Turkish artillery. But on the eve of the 13th Vendémiaire (5th October 1795) he was appointed second in command of the Army of the Interior under Barras, and did the National Convention good service next day in repelling the attack of the Sections of Paris. Influenced partly by fear and partly by appreciation of his talents, the Directory appointed General Bonaparte to the command of the Army of Italy on 23d February 1796. On 9th March he married Joséphine Tascher de la Pagerie, widow of General Vicomte Alexandre de Beauharnais, and left Paris for Italy two days later.
On joining the army Bonaparte inaugurated a new era in the wars of the Republic. Previously the leading motives had been pure patriotism and love of liberty; Bonaparte for the first time, in his proclamation on taking command, invoked the spirit of self-interest and plunder, which was to dominate the whole policy of France for the next twenty years. Evil as were the passions which he aroused, Napoleon's great military genius flashed forth in its full brilliancy in this his first campaign. His power lay in the rapidity and boldness of his decisions, and in the untiring energy with which he carried them out, confounding his enemies by the suddenness and lightning rapidity of his blows, which never gave them time to recover. He found the French army about 36,000 strong, distributed along the crests of the mountains from Nice to Savona, and opposing 20,000 Piedmontese under Colli and 38,000 Austrians under Beaulieu. These two generals had, however, differing interests: Colli's main object was to protect Piedmont, Beaulieu's to cover Lombardy. Hence, if Bonaparte could penetrate the point of junction of the two armies, it was probable they would separate in their retreat, and could be beaten singly. He therefore attacked the centre of the allied line, and, driving back the Austrians from Montenotte on the 12th April, turned against the Piedmontese and defeated them at Millesimo the next day. Losing no time he left a division under Augereau to keep the Piedmontese in check, and led the bulk of his army against the Austrians, defeating them heavily at Dego on the 14th. The allied armies then retreated in diverging directions as expected, and Bonaparte, following the Piedmontese, beat them at Ceva and Mondovi, and forced the king of Sardinia to sign the armistice of Cherasco, leaving him free to deal with the Austrians. He crossed the Po at Piacenza on the 7th May, and obliged the Austrians to retreat to the Adda. Following them he forced the bridge of Lodi on the 11th May, and entered Milan amid the rejoicings of the people on the 15th. But his ill-omened proclamation had done its work; violence and pillage were rampant in the French army, and he could do little to restrain them. Indeed, he himself showed an example of plundering, though under more organised forms. Heavy contributions were exacted, curiosities and works of art were demanded wholesale and despatched to France; and the Directory, demoralised by the unaccustomed wealth that flowed in upon them, became fully as cager as Napoleon for fresh conquests and their accruing spoils. Insurrections followed at Pavia and in the Milanese, but were ruthlessly put down, and on the 27th May the army left Milan to follow Beaulieu to the Mincio. The Austrians defended the whole line of this river, but Napoleon, drawing the bulk of their forces northward by a feint, broke through their centre at Borghetto, and Beaulieu retreated into Tyrol, leaving the line of the Adige to Napoleon. This he at once occupied, taking Verona and Legnano from the neutral republic of Venice, whom he frightened into submission.
The Austrians still held Mantua, which Napoleon now besieged, occupying himself at the same time in consolidating his conquests. The Austrians made strenuous efforts to save the fortress. They had about 20,000 men in Mantua, and Wurmsier advanced through Tyrol with 50,000 more, while the French were only some 45,000 strong including the siege corps. Wurmsier moved in three columns: one descended the Adige and threatened Verona, another moving between the Adige and the Lake of Garda drove Joubert and Masséna from Rivoli and Corona, while the third under Quasdanovich moved west of the Lake of Garda and seized Brescia, threatening the French communications. Napoleon's position was very critical, but he made a rapid decision, raised the siege of Mantua, spiking his guns and destroying his stores, moved all the force he could collect against Quasdanovich, and defeated him at Lonato on the 31st July. Wurmsier moving on Mantua found no enemy there, and missed being at the decisive point at the right time. Napoleon, leaving a small force to watch Quasdanovich, turned rapidly back against the other two Austrian columns which were not yet fully united, and beat their most advanced troops at Lonato again on the 3d August and Wurmsier himself at Castiglione on the 5th, driving him back into Tyrol with the loss of half his army. Mantua was again invested, but, the siege-artillery having been lost, the operations against it were reduced to a blockade. In the beginning of September Napoleon took the offensive against Wurmsier, and passing boldly behind him defeated him at Bassano, cut off his retreat, and forced him to take refuge in Mantua on the 15th September. Again, at the end of October, an Austrian army of 50,000, but mostly recruits, advanced under Alvinzi. Napoleon could now dispose of from 38,000 to 40,000 men, having in the meantime formed the Cispadane Republic and raised an Italian legion which set free most of his garrisons. Alvinzi arrived before Verona, while a column under Davidovich moved by the eastern shore of the Lake of Garda. Napoleon hastily caused the positions of Rivoli and Corona to be reoccupied to check Davidovich, and moved himself by night from Verona down the right bank of the Adige, crossed it at Ronco, and came upon Alvinzi's rear. Then followed the three days' battle of Arcola, during which Napoleon had a very narrow escape, but which ended in Alvinzi's defeat and retreat on Tyrol. From Arcola Napoleon dated his firm belief in his own fortune. Once again, in January 1797, Alvinzi tried to relieve Mantua. Feinting against Legnano to deceive Napoleon, he intended to make his main advance between the Adige and the lake. But Napoleon was too skilful to take decided action without full knowledge, and keeping his reserve half-way between Rivoli and Legnano waited for more certain news. When he ascertained the direction of the real attack, he moved in full force on Rivoli and won a decisive battle there on January 14, the Austrian detachment on the Lower Adige having to lay down their arms next day at Roverella. Wurmsier capitulated at Mantua on the 2d February, Napoleon treating him with generosity. This first Italian campaign was perhaps the most skilful of all those of Napoleon. Everything was done accurately and rapidly, and without throwing away chances. Some of his later campaigns, though equally brilliant, show him acting more with the gambler's spirit, running unnecessary risks with almost a blind reliance upon his star, in the hope of obtaining results which should dazzle the world.
In political matters during this time Napoleon was acting less as a servant of the French Directory than as an independent ruler. He entirely ignored the instructions he received from Paris, levying contributions, entering into negotiations and depositing princes at his own will, and writing that he is not fighting 'for those rascals of lawyers.' His policy was in fact regulated in accordance with his own ambitious schemes; and we find him adopting a conciliatory attitude towards Rome with an eye to the future support of the church.
When his position in Italy was secured by the fall of Mantua, and by treaties with Rome and Sardinia, he prepared to advance through Carinthia and Styria on Vienna. He pushed back the Archduke Charles from the Tagliamento, and advanced till he reached Leoben in Styria on the 7th April 1797. Then Austria sued for peace, and the preliminaries of Leoben were signed on the 18th April pending the conclusion of a definite peace. But further negotiations dragged on, as Austria thought a revolution might be impending in France from which she could obtain advantage. In fact a party was rising against the Directory, consisting mainly of moderates who were eager only for a respectable government, but containing also a few royalists. Their inclusion was fatal to the party. It gave a pretext for raising the cry that the Republic was in danger, and Augereau, sent by Napoleon to Paris, aided the Directory to carry out the coup d'état of the 18th Fructidor, when the Corps Legislatif was surrounded by troops and the obnoxious representatives arrested. This strengthened the Directory for the moment, but was a step towards military despotism under Napoleon. Austria, seeing the Directory again firmly seated in power, became more eager for peace, the negotiations were hastened, and on 17th October 1797 the treaty of Campo-Formio was signed. By this France obtained Belgium and the Ionian Islands, Austria also acknowledging the Cisalpine Republic, and ceding to it Lombardy, and engaging to try and get the left bank of the Rhine for France from the Germanic body. As an indemnity Austria obtained Istria, Dalmatia, and the territory of the Venetian Republic, with whom, although neutral, Napoleon had managed to pick a quarrel with this end in view.
Napoleon returned to Paris on the 5th December 1797. The Directory, fearing his ambition, thought they could only keep him quiet by employing him, and gave him command of the so-called Army of England. But he was bent on the conquest of Egypt. He appears to have had something visionary in his temperament, and to have dreamed of founding a mighty empire from the standpoint of the East, the glow and glamour of which seem always to have had a certain fascination for him. He therefore employed the resources of the Army of England to prepare for an expedition to Egypt, and the Directory yielded to his wishes, partly no doubt through the desire of getting him away from France. But their aggressive policy was at the same time fast bringing on another European war. The expedition sailed from Toulon on the 19th May 1798, captured Malta from the Knights of St John by treachery, and, escaping by great luck from the British fleet under Nelson, arrived at Alexandria on the 30th June. The army was disembarked in haste, for fear lest Nelson should arrive, and on the 8th July Napoleon marched on Cairo. He defeated the Mamelukes at Chebreiss and the Pyramids, and entered Cairo on the 24th July. He then occupied himself with organising the government of Egypt, but his position was rendered very hazardous by the destruction of the French fleet on the 1st August by Nelson at the battle of the Nile, and he saw that his dream of founding an empire in the East could not be realised. He thought, however, that he might create a revolution in Syria, by the aid of which he might overthrow the Turkish power and march in triumph back to Europe through Asia Minor and Constantinople. He accordingly entered Syria in February 1799 with 12,000 men, but was brought to a standstill before St Jean d'Acre. Failing to capture that fortress, supported as it was by the British squadron under Sir Sidney Smith, in spite of the most desperate efforts, he was obliged to return to Egypt. The expedition to Syria was disgraced by the massacre in cold blood of 2500 prisoners at Jaffa; but there seems to be some doubt about the truth of the story that in his retreat Napoleon caused the sick he could not transport to be poisoned. After his return to Egypt, Napoleon defeated a Turkish army which had landed at Aboukir, but learning the reverses that had been suffered by the French arms in Europe, he resolved to leave Egypt and return to France. He embarked secretly on the 22d August, leaving a letter placing Kléber in command of the Army of Egypt, and landed in France six weeks later.
He found matters at home in great confusion. The wars had been mismanaged, Italy was almost lost, and the government in consequence was in very bad odour. Siéyès, one of the Directors, meditated a coup d'état, but was at a loss for a man of action to take the lead. At this juncture Bonaparte arrived, and, though for some time there was no rapprochement between him and Siéyès (the latter fearing Bonaparte's masterful character, and Bonaparte uncertain what party it would be most to his advantage to join), they at length coalesced, and the revolution of the 18th Brumaire followed (9th November 1799), when the legislature was forcibly closed and a provisional executive of three consuls, Siéyès, Roger-Ducos, and Bonaparte, formed to draw up a new constitution. This was promulgated on the 13th December; the executive was vested in three consuls, Bonaparte, Cambacérès, and Lebrun, of whom Bonaparte was nominated First Consul for ten years. He was practically paramount, the two remaining consuls being ciphers, and the other institutions being so organised as to concentrate power in the executive. Siéyès became president of the senate. The governmental crisis being settled, energetic steps were taken with regard to the civil war in the west. A proclamation was issued promising religious toleration at the same time that decided military action was taken, and these measures were so successful that all was quiet at home by the end of February 1800. Then Napoleon turned his attention abroad. He made overtures for peace to England and Austria, now the only belligerents, as he wished to lull suspicion by posing as the friend of peace, not as a military ruler; but he inwardly rejoiced when they rejected his overtures.
The situation of the belligerents on the Continent was this: the Army of the Rhine under Moreau, more than 100,000 strong, was distributed along the Rhine from the Lake of Constance to Alsace, opposed to Kray, whose headquarters were at Donauerschingen in Baden; while Masséna with the Army of Italy was on the Riviera and at Genoa, opposed to an Austrian army under Melas. Napoleon intended to gain himself the chief glory of the campaign; so, giving Moreau orders to cross the Rhine but not to advance beyond a certain limit, and leaving Masséna to make head as best he could against Melas, with the result that he was besieged in Genoa and reduced to the last extremity, he prepared secretly an army of reserve near the Swiss frontier, to the command of which Berthier was ostensibly appointed. Outside and even inside France this army of reserve was looked upon as a chimera. Moreau crossed the Rhine on the 24th April and drove Kray to Ulm, but was there checked by Napoleon's instructions, according to which he also sent a division to co-operate with the army of reserve. Napoleon himself went to Geneva on the 9th May, and assuming command of this army crossed the St Bernard and reached the plains of Italy before Melas had convinced himself of the existence even of the army of reserve, and whilst his troops were scattered from Genoa to the Var. Napoleon's obvious course would now have been to move straight on Genoa, relieve Masséna, and beat in detail as many of Melas' troops as he could encounter. But this would not have been a sufficiently brilliant triumph, as the bulk of the Austrian army might have escaped; and trusting in his star he resolved to stake the existence of his army on a gambler's cast. Leaving Masséna to be starved out, he moved to the left on Milan, and occupied the whole line of the Ticino and Po as far as Piacenza, so as to cut off entirely the retreat of the Austrians. He then crossed the Po and concentrated as many troops as he could spare at Stradella. The strategy was brilliant, but the risk ran excessive. His army was necessarily scattered, while Melas had had time to concentrate, and he was besides ignorant of the Austrian position. He sent Desaix with a column to seek information, and moved himself on Alessandria, where he found Melas. Next day, the 14th June, Melas marched out to attack the French on the plains of Marengo, and despite all Napoleon's efforts had actually defeated them, when fortunately Desaix returned, and his advance, together with a cavalry charge by Kellermann, changed defeat into victory. Melas, losing his head, signed a convention next day giving up almost all North Italy, though Marmont says that if he had fought another battle he must have won it. Napoleon returned to Paris with the glories of this astonishing campaign; but peace did not follow till Moreau, when his liberty of action was restored to him, had won the battle of Hohenlinden on 3d December 1800. Then followed the treaty of Lunéville with Germany in February 1801, the concordat with Rome in July 1801, and the treaty of Amiens with England in March 1802, so that Napoleon was able to figure as the restorer of peace to the world. He then devoted himself to the reconstruction of the civil institutions of France, employing in this great work the best talent that he could find, and impressing on their labours the stamp of his own genius. The institutions then created, which still remain for the most part, were the restored church, the judicial system, the codes, the system of local government, the university, the Bank of France, and the Legion of Honour.
France at this period, sick of the failure of republican government, was gradually veering towards monarchy, and Napoleon knew how to take advantage of events to strengthen his position, and in due time establish his own dynasty. The plot of Nivose (24th December 1800), when his life was threatened by a bomb, gave him a pretext for arresting and transporting 130 members of the Jacobin party, with which he had long since broken; and after the conclusion of the peace of Amiens a great step was taken when, as a mark of public gratitude for the pacification of the world, he was elected First Consul for life. But though he desired the credit of making peace, so as to enable him to establish his authority over France, when that end was secured he became again eager for war, with a view to further extension of his power. He also desired to humble England, a desire that led to the rupture of the peace of Amiens in 1803. The immediate causes of this rupture were his aggressions in Holland, in the Cisalpine Republic, in Genoa, and Piedmont, and his monstrous demand that England should suppress every print that dared to criticise his actions, and drive all French refugees from her shores. Having thus forced England to resume hostilities, he made vast preparations for her invasion, at the same time taking the first step towards establishing his ascendancy in Germany by seizing Hanover. The assumption of the crown soon followed, Napoleon preparing the way with consummate cunning. He rid himself of Moreau, his most dangerous rival, by accusing him of conspiring with the royalists, into whom he then struck terror by the execution of the Duc d'Enghien. He thus succeeded in inspiring even republicans with the conviction that the best way of preventing the inauguration of a new reign of terror was by confirming his position. He chose the title of emperor as least obnoxious to the republican feeling of the army, and the change was made by a decree of the senate of the 18th May 1804.
Preparations for the invasion of England had been steadily proceeding, but Napoleon's aggressive demeanour after becoming emperor alarmed the European cabinets, so that Pitt was able to revive the coalition, and in 1805 Napoleon found himself at war with Russia and Austria, as well as with England. Forced by England's naval supremacy to abandon the notion of invasion, he suddenly changed front in August 1805, and led his armies through Hanover and the smaller German states, disregarding the neutrality even of Prussia herself, and reached the Danube in rear of the Austrian army under Mack, which was at Ulm. The surprise was complete; Mack surrendered on the 19th October, and Napoleon then marched on Vienna, which he entered on the 13th November. But his position was critical. The Archduke Charles was approaching from Hungary, a Russian army was entering Moravia, and Prussia, incensed at the violation of her territory, joined the coalition. A short delay would have surrounded Napoleon with his enemies, but the Czar was impatient, and the Russian army, with a small contingent of Austrians, encountered Napoleon at Austerlitz, December 2, 1805, and was signally defeated. This caused the break-up of the coalition; the Holy Roman Empire came to an end, the Confederation of the Rhine was formed under French protection, and the Napoleonic empire was firmly established. Napoleon then entered into negotiations for peace with Russia and England, endeavouring to conciliate those powers at the expense of Prussia. The negotiations failed, but Prussia was mortally offended, and mobilised her army in August 1806, about which time Russia finally rejected the treaty with France. Napoleon acted with his usual promptitude, and advanced against Prussia before she could get help either from England or Russia. Although the rank and file of the Prussian armies was good, their generals were antiquated, and Napoleon crushed them at Jena and Auerstädt on the 14th October, and entered Berlin on the 27th. He had then to carry on a stubbornly-contested campaign with Russia. An indecisive battle at Eylau was followed by a hardly-earned French victory at Friedland, 14th June 1807, and the peace of Tilsit ensued, by which Prussia lost half her territory, and had to submit to various humiliating conditions, while Russia escaped easily, and indeed got a share of the spoils.
Napoleon was now at the zenith of his power; he was the arbiter of Europe and the paramount head of a confederation of princes, among whom the members of his own family occupied several thrones. To reward his partisans he at this time created a new noblesse, and lavished upon them the public money. Full of inveterate hostility to England, Napoleon endeavoured to cripple her by the so-called Continental System (q.v.), by which all the states under his influence engaged to close their ports to English ships, and he also tried to combine all the European navies against her; but England, perceiving his aim, took the initiative and herself seized the Danish fleet. The emperor also turned his eyes to the Peninsula, where the dissolute conduct of the Queen of Spain and the intrigues of 'the Prince of the Peace' (see ALCUDIA) gave him an opportunity. He sent an army under Junot to Portugal, and another to Spain, which, under Murat, took Madrid. Napoleon then procured the abdication of the king of Spain and placed his brother Joseph on the vacant throne. But he did not foresee the consequences. The spirit of the nation was roused, and a formidable insurrection broke out, while a British army, under Sir Arthur Wellesley, landed in Portugal, defeated Junot at Vimiera, and forced him to sign the Convention of Cintra, evacuating Portugal. So began the Peninsular war which for the future was to paralyse half Napoleon's strength.
In Germany also a spirit of revolt against his tyranny was rising, Austria at first taking the lead, and this brought on the war of 1809 against that power. Prussia, already beginning to recover her strength under the military system of Scharnhorst and Stein (see SCHARNHORST, STEIN), was hostile to Napoleon in sentiment, but was kept down by the pressure of Russia. Napoleon declared war on the pretext that Austria was arming, and marching through Bavaria drove the Austrians out of Ratisbon, and entered Vienna on the 13th May. Eugène Beauharnais, at the head of the Army of Italy, drove the Austrians before him into Hungary, defeated them at Raab, and joined Napoleon. The emperor then tried to cross the Danube, but was checked at Aspern and obliged to retire to the island of Lobau. Five weeks of preparation then followed, the peasant war under Hofer being carried on in Tyrol, and then Napoleon made a fresh and successful attempt to cross the Danube, and won the battle of Wagram on the 5th and 6th July. This was followed by the armistice of Znaïm and the treaty of Schönbrunn, October 20, 1809, by which he obtained a heavy indemnity in money and considerable accession of territory in Carniola, Carinthia, Croatia, and Galicia. But he mortally offended the Czar by giving a large portion of the ceded territory of Galicia to the duchy of Warsaw—i.e. to Poland.
On the 16th December 1809 Napoleon, desirous of an heir, divorced Joséphine, who was childless, and married on the 1st April 1810 the Archduchess Maria Louisa of Austria. He had no doubt the wish also to get a footing in the circle of the legitimate reigning families of Europe. A son, to whom the title of King of Rome was given, was born on March 20, 1811.
Still bent on the humiliation of England, Napoleon now tried to effect his purpose by increasing the stringency of the Continental System, but this ended in bringing him into conflict with Russia. He first annexed the kingdoms of Holland and Westphalia, to give him command of their seabords, and then prohibited English trade even when carried in neutral bottoms. The Czar, already estranged by Napoleon's alliance with Austria and his conduct as regards Poland, refused to adopt this policy, and the relations between them gradually became so strained that war was inevitable, and Napoleon took the momentous resolve to invade Russia. With Maria Louisa, he arrived at Dresden on the 16th May 1812, and was there greeted by the emperor of Austria, the king of Prussia, and other sovereigns. His army for this gigantic enterprise numbered about 600,000, including French, Germans, and Italians. He crossed the Niemen on the 24th June, reaching Vilna, which was evacuated by the Russians, on the 28th; and he remained at Vilna till the 16th July, hesitating to take the final resolution to invade the heart of Russia. He made overtures for peace to the Czar, who refused to treat as long as an enemy remained on Russian soil. Foiled here Napoleon at last decided to go on with his enterprise; so he advanced, and at first the Russians were in no condition to meet him, their forces being scattered. If Napoleon could have advanced rapidly to Smolensk, he might have cut the Russian forces in two, but his vast host appears to have been unmanageable. Barclay de Tolly and Bagration succeeded in uniting at Smolensk, but were driven from it on the 18th August after an obstinate defence. At Smolensk Napoleon again hesitated as to whether he should go into winter-quarters, but eventually decided to press on to Moscow, trusting to the moral effect of the fall of the ancient capital. It seems as if, while his superstitious belief in his star still remained, bodily ailments had caused a deterioration in his power of rapid decision and in his energy of action. Meanwhile, great discontent had been caused in Russia by the continued retreat of the armies. Kutusoff was appointed to the chief command, and stood to fight at Borodino on September 6. Napoleon won the battle, but with unwonted and misplaced caution refused to engage his Guard, and the victory was almost fruitless.
He entered Moscow on the 14th September, and fire broke out the next night, the first effect of which was still further to alarm the Russians, who believed it to be the work of the French. The fire raged fiercely till the 20th, and a great part of the city was burned to the ground. Had the victory of Borodino been more decisive the Czar might now have yielded; but as it was he listened to the advice of Stein and Sir R. Wilson and refused to treat, thus putting Napoleon in a dilemma. His plans were always made on the basis of immediate success, and the course to be adopted in case of failure was not considered. Again he hesitated, with the result that when at last he resolved to retire from Moscow the winter, coming earlier than usual, upset his calculations, and the miseries of that terrible retreat followed. He left Moscow on the 18th October, and, reaching the Bérésina with but 12,000 men, was joined there by Oudinot and Victor, who had been holding the line of the Dwina, with 18,000. His passage of the river was opposed, but he succeeded in crossing, and on the 6th December the miserable remnant of the Grand Army reached Vilna. Macdonald, Reynier, and Schwarzenberg, with 100,000 men, on the Polish frontier and in the Baltic provinces, were safe, but this was the whole available remnant of the 600,000 with which the campaign commenced. It might have been expected that Napoleon would now be anxious for peace, but his haughty spirit could not brook any diminution of his prestige, and, determining to try and efface the past with fresh triumphs, he returned to Paris to raise new levies. The Czar fully understood that no half-measures would be of any avail, but that he must follow up what had been begun and carry the war into Germany the next year, rousing the Germans to his aid. On the 30th December 1812 the Prussian contingent of the Grand Army, under York, came over to the Russians, and on the 22d January 1813 Stein procured the meeting of the estates of East Prussia, when the Landwehr was called out. Saxony also joined Russia, contrary to the wishes of the king, but Austria and the middle states still elung to Napoleon.
Napoleon left Paris for Mainz on the 15th April 1813, his object being Dresden, which was held by the Czar and the king of Prussia. Eugène Beauharnais was on the Lower Saale with 70,000 men, and Napoleon, with 150,000 men, well officered, though raw and short of cavalry, moved to meet him by way of Erfurt. Davoût was holding down insurrection in north Germany with 30,000. The allies at first had only 100,000 available, the process of calling out and drilling the people being slow. Napoleon moved on Leipzig, and won the battle of Lützen on the 2d May, which restored Dresden to the king of Saxony. He then followed the allies, beat them, though with heavy loss, at Bautzen on the 20th and 21st May, and forced them to retire into Silesia. The armistice of Poischwitz, signed on the 4th of June, closed the first period of the campaign. Austria then asked for certain concessions, which if Napoleon had granted he might have checkmated the coalition of Prussia and Russia; but he seems to have been unable to bring himself to accede, and contemplated rather war with Prussia, Russia, and Austria combined, to say nothing of England, which was still carrying on the war in the Peninsula. A treaty was signed at Reichenbach on the 14th June, by which Austria engaged as mediating power to offer conditions of peace to Napoleon and to declare war on him in case of refusal. The conditions offered were that he should withdraw from north-west Germany, dissolve the duchy of Warsaw, and cede Illyria. These terms were very moderate, but Napoleon seems to have thought his position insecure without fresh success in war, and procrastinated. An ultimatum was delivered to him on August 8th to which he paid no attention; so on the night of the 10th to 11th August the armistice was declared at an end, and the drama swept rapidly to its crisis.
Napoleon had now 400,000 men along the Elbe from Bohemia to its mouth, but his position was weakened by the adhesion of Austria to the coalition, as she massed her troops in Bohemia, threatening Dresden and his communications. The allies had nearly 500,000 men in three armies, the Austrian under Schwarzenberg in Bohemia, the old Prusso-Russian under Blücher in Silesia, and the bulk of the Prussian force under Bernadotte in Brandenburg. The French armies were discouraged, and the allies enthusiastic; but the latter had difficulties to contend with from their heterogeneous composition and diversity of interests. The campaign opened with varying fortune. A blow at Berlin was parried by Bülow at Gross-Beeren on August 23. Napoleon himself forced Blücher back to the Katzbach, but had to retire again to defend Dresden from the Austrians; and his lieutenant Macdonald was defeated in the battle of the Katzbach on the 26th August. Napoleon inflicted a crushing defeat on the Austrians before Dresden on the 27th, but, while preparing to cut off their retreat, was disturbed by the news of Gross-Beeren and the Katzbach and by sudden illness, and at Kulm lost Vandamme with 20,000 men. September was spent in fruitless marches, now into Bohemia, now into Silesia, and towards the end of the month the allies began their converging march on their preconceived rendezvous at Leipzig. At the same time the Confederation of the Rhine began to dissolve. The kingdom of Westphalia was upset on the 1st October, and on the 8th Bavaria joined Austria. The toils were closing round Napoleon, and between the 14th and 19th October he was crushed in that battle of the Titans at Leipzig, and, brushing aside the Bavarians who tried to stop him at Haynau, on the 1st November led back the remnant of his army, some 70,000 strong, across the Rhine at Mainz.
The allies now made overtures for peace on the basis of natural frontiers, which would have left France the fruits of the first Revolution—viz. Belgium, the left bank of the Rhine, Savoy, and Nice; but Napoleon could not be content with such entailment of his power. Evading at first the proposal, he would have accepted it, but with suspicious qualifications, when too late. The invasion of France followed. The allies issued on the 1st December a manifesto saying they were waging war against Napoleon alone, and advanced with three separate armies. Schwarzenberg led the Austrians through Switzerland, Blücher crossed the Middle Rhine towards Nancy, while the northern army passed through Holland. Napoleon had yet hopes of success on account of the forces he still had in the German fortresses, the mutual jealousies of the allies, his connection with the emperor of Austria, and the patriotism which would be aroused in France by invasion. But the allies gave him no time to utilise these influences, and Paris was not fortified. Napoleon carried on a campaign full of genius, gaining what advantage he could from the separation of his enemies. He attacked Blücher and won four battles in four days at Champaubert (February 10, 1814), Montmirail (11th), Château-Thierry (12th), and Vauchamps (13th). These successes would have enabled him to make a reasonable peace, but his personal position forbade this, and he tried subterfuge and delay. The allies, however, were not to be trifled with, and in the beginning of March signed the treaty of Chaumont, which bound them each to keep 150,000 men on foot for twenty years. The battles of Craonne and Laon followed, in which Napoleon held his own, but saw his resources dwindle. On the 18th March the conferences at Chatillon came to an end, and on the 24th the allies determined to march on Paris. Marmont and Mortier, with less than 30,000 men, could make no head against them, while Napoleon himself tried a fruitless diversion against their communications. Joseph Bonaparte withdrew Maria Louisa and the king of Rome to Tours. On the 30th March the allies attacked Paris on three sides, and in the afternoon the French marshals offered to capitulate. Napoleon, when he learned the real state of affairs, hurried up in rear of the allies, but was too late, and had to fall back to Fontainebleau. His position was desperate, and to add to his difficulties Wellington, whose career of success had gradually cleared the French out of the Peninsula, had now led his victorious army across the Pyrenees into France itself.
Napoleon therefore at first offered to abdicate in favour of his son, but, when he found that would not be sufficient, he signed an unconditional abdication on the 11th April 1814. He was given the sovereignty of the island of Elba, and the Bourbons in the person of Louis XVIII. were restored to the throne of France. But the condition of affairs was very precarious. The return of the Bourbons was most unpopular. It indeed restored the parliament, but it unsettled the position of public men and the title to estates. The army was disgusted at the appointment to commands of emigrés who had fought against France. The church began to cause alarm to the holders of national property; and by the release of prisoners and the return of the garrisons of German fortresses very large numbers of Napoleonic soldiers became dispersed over France. The coalition, too, broke up, and fresh alliances began to be sought with a view to check the aggressive spirit which Russia seemed inclined to manifest. Altogether affairs in Europe and France were in such a state as to make it not impossible that the magic of Napoleon's name might replace him in power. He accordingly resolved on making the attempt, left Elba on February 26, 1815, and landed on the French coast on the 1st March. On the 20th he entered Paris, having been joined by the army. He had the advantage of being able to appear as the liberator of France from the yoke put upon her by foreigners, but he could only re-establish his position in the face of the rest of Europe by war, and he was not quite the Napoleon of old, for his physical powers had declined, he had become stout, and had attacks of illness, sleepiness, and indolence. He had been epileptic from his youth. His mind and genius were unimpaired, and his conception of the Waterloo campaign was clear and brilliant as of yore, but the execution failed.
Europe had declared war against him, and a new coalition had been formed, but only two armies were immediately ready to take the field; a mixed force under the Duke of Wellington in Belgium, and a Prussian army under Blücher in the Rhine provinces. The English army had its base on the sea, and the Prussian on the Rhine, so that they had diverging lines of operation. Napoleon's idea was to strike suddenly at their point of junction before they could concentrate, push in between them, drive them apart, and then defeat each separately. The plan was unexceptionable, resembling that of his first campaign in 1796, and the opening moves were successfully carried out. Napoleon left Paris on the 12th June, his army being then écheloned between Paris and the Belgian frontier, so that the point where the blow would fall was still doubtful. On the 15th he occupied Charleroi, and was between the two allied armies, and on the 16th he defeated Blücher at Ligny before Wellington could come to his assistance. So far all had gone well with him; but now apparently his energy was not sufficient to cope rapidly with the difficulties that no doubt beset him through the shortcomings of his staff, and the spirit of mutual distrust that reigned among his officers. He did nothing till the morning of the 17th, and it was not till 2 P.M. that he sent Grouchy with 33,000 men to follow the Prussians in the supposed direction of their retreat towards Liège, and keep them at a distance whilst he turned against Wellington. But he had lost his opportunity; the wasted hours had enabled the Prussians to disappear, and he did not know the fact that Blücher had taken the resolution to move on Wavre, giving up his own communications in order to reunite with Wellington. The latter had retired to a previously-chosen position at Mont St Jean, and received Blücher's promise to lead his army to his assistance. So on the 18th, when Napoleon attacked the Duke, unknown to him the bulk of the Prussian army was hastening up on his right flank while Grouchy was fruitlessly engaged with the Prussian rear-guard only. This led to the crowning defeat of Waterloo, where Napoleon's fortunes were finally wrecked. He fled to Paris, and abdicated for the last time on 22d June; and, finding it impossible to escape from France, he surrendered to Captain Maitland of the Bellerophon at Rochefort on the 15th July. He was banished by the British government to St Helena, where he arrived on the 15th October 1815, and died there of cancer of the stomach on the 5th May 1821.
The literature referring to Napoleon may be divided into three categories: First, books dealing with his military and political career by writers contemporary with him or nearly so, such as Thiers' Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire; Jomini's Vie politique et militaire de Napoléon (Eng. trans. 1885); Montholon and Gourgaud's Mémoires pour servir à l'Histoire de France sous Napoléon; and the memoirs of his generals, such as Marmont, Masséna, and Sachet. Secondly, books touching his private life by contemporaries, such as Bourrienne's Mémoires of Napoleon Bonaparte; Las Cases' Journal of Private Life and Conversations of Napoleon at St Helena; Forsyth's History of the Captivity of Napoleon at St Helena, from Letters and Journals of Sir Hudson Lowe; O'Meara's Napoleon at St Helena. In contrast to these two classes, both inevitably one-sided, are works written in a more critical spirit, such as those by Lanfrey, Jung, and Guillois (1889) in France, with the relevant part of Taine, and those by Seeley, O'Connor Morris (1893), Lord Wolsley (1895), W. M. Sloane (1896-97), and Lord Rosebery (1900). Most valuable also is the Correspondance de Napoléon I. (32 vols.). See also articles BONAPARTE, CODE NAPOLÉON, FRANCE, JOSÉPHINE, WATERLOO, WELLINGTON, and for his last resting-place, PARIS (p. 765).